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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores three unique topics in development and environmental
economics. The first paper looks at the value people place on clean air in Mexico City
using an alternative air pollution measure to the typical ground measurement. Research
and policy addressing air pollution remains hampered by a lack of ground level air
quality data. This study attempts to overcome this issue using aerosol optical depth from
satellite imagery as a proxy for air pollution. Using a hedonic framework and least
squares estimation, results show that Mexico City residents place a significant value on
clean air as demonstrated by their choices of where to live and work.
The second paper focuses on the secondary, unintended consequences of the
daylight saving time (DST) policy in Mexico. Shifting the clocks in spring and fall is
intended to reduce energy consumption. However, there is growing evidence it is also
linked to increased automobile fatalities, homicides, and other negative outcomes. This
study uses a regression discontinuity design to exploit the acute shift in time to
understand the social cost associated with DST. Results show there to be an increase in
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fatalities in three areas that potentially outweigh the economic and social savings in
energy reduction.
The final paper explores the economic and ecological impacts from different
management strategies of the gray wolf in the upper Rocky Mountain region. After a
successful reintroduction into the area, three states now independently manage the
controversial species. Theoretical optimal control and system dynamics bioeconomic
models were developed to determine the steady states for the number of wolves, their
management, and corresponding net benefits for Idaho, Montana, Wyoming. The models
indicate that there exist beneficial economic and ecological spillover effects to jointly
managing wolves in the region.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The following dissertation looks at three distinct areas in both developmental and
environmental economics. The first essay explores the use of remotely sensed data as a
proxy for ground monitored data to determine the value people place on clean air. The
second essay focuses on daylight saving time in Mexico to see the extent of secondary
impacts beyond the policy’s intent of energy reduction and whether this creates a social
burden. Finally, the last chapter examines the reintroduction of the gray wolf into the
Upper Rocky Mountain Region, which is currently managed independently by three
different states, to see if there could be any positive economic and environmental
spillover effects if they were to work jointly.
Chapter 2 focuses on air pollution and the potential for using remotely sensed
pollution data to overcome insufficient ground monitoring while assessing the value of
clean air to people. While air pollution remains a global concern, research and policy
addressing the problem remains hampered by a lack of ground level air quality data,
especially in developing nations. The motivation of this chapter is to determine the
efficacy of using satellite data as a proxy in the particular case study of Mexico City,
which has a legacy of being one of the more polluted cities in the world.
Specifically, we estimate the value residents of Mexico City place on clean air
using aerosol optical depth (AOD) from satellite imagery as an alternative source for air
pollution monitoring. AOD reports the level of aerosols in a column of air which is
indicative of the level of particulate matter or pollution. We compile a dataset that
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combines actual household level data from home mortgage originations with NASA’s
MODIS 3-kilometer AOD data. From this, using a hedonic model, we focus specifically
on people’s decisions regarding where to work and live in Mexico City in relationship to
air pollution. We address endogeneity and simultaneity concerns, inherent in hedonic
studies, by using a 3SLS-IV estimation and instrumenting pollution data with rainfall.
Previous evidence has shown that rain in cities with high particulate matter can scrub
pollutants from the air for a period of time increasing air quality.
Our results suggest that residents place significant value on clean air, with a 10%
increase in AOD leading to a 1.3% decrease in home prices and a 2.3% increase in
wages. These findings are important for two reasons. First, they are in agreement with
previous works suggesting that AOD can indeed be used in certain studies as a proxy for
ground monitor data. Second, specific to the case study, it shows that residents of
Mexico City do place value on clean air which often receives lower priority than other
developmental objectives
The third chapter explores the impact of secondary effects of the daylight saving
time (DST) policy in Mexico. Like many other countries in the world, Mexico uses DST
as a way to reduce energy consumption during the summer by shifting more human
activity to the daylight. And while there is mixed evidence that this policy is successful
at its intent, DST has been shown to reduce energy consumption in Mexico. However,
over time it has become evident that there are secondary impacts of DST such as
increased automobile accidents and chronobiological impacts like acute myocardial
infarctions (AMI). In many cases these are caused by a disruption in sleep or from
varying the levels of ambient light in the morning and evening.
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The chapter establishes if there is any relationship between automobile, AMI, and
crime fatalities and DST in Mexico. The acute shift in time in both the spring and fall
allows us to employ a regression discontinuity design looking at the fatalities around
these transitions. Our results show there to be a high social cost associated with these
secondary effects. We found there to be an increase in automobile fatalities in both the
spring and fall transitions, increased AMI risk in the spring transition, and greater
homicides during the fall transition. These results advocate for Mexico to reconsider the
use of DST by understanding the full costs associated with the policy.
The final chapter examines economic and ecological impacts of management
strategies for the reintroduction of the gray wolf (Canis lupus). The restoration of a
population of wolves has been largely successful in the upper Rocky Mountain region
(URM). This led the federal government to hand over the responsibility of managing the
species to the individual states of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. As each state currently
works mainly independently, this study examines if there are any spillover effects to
jointly managing wolves in the region.
We develop theoretical optimal control and system dynamics bioeconomic
models to determine the steady states for the number of wolves, their management, and
corresponding net benefits for Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, and the region as a whole from
2000 to 2030. Specifically, we consider the tradeoff between the costs of maintaining a
viable wolf population along with the damages of human property to the benefits from
revenue that they generate.
Results from the models show potential benefits when states work together in the
form of greater economic efficiencies in management and potentially larger wolf
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populations. Using a system dynamics model, we find the optimal management path
under three different management scenarios with the possibility of improving net benefits
by almost $1 million per year when states work together. Our results provide meaningful
insights for policymakers which could potentially impact how states approach
management of a species that can be both expensive and controversial.
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CHAPTER 2
Estimating the Impact of Pollution on Wages and Housing Prices Using
Satellite Imagery
2.1. Introduction
Air pollution continues to be a global concern impacting human health and the
environment. Ground level monitoring stations remain the primary source of air pollution
data. However, many developing countries have yet to implement an extensive network
of monitors. In this study we use aerosol optical depth (AOD) satellite imagery as an
alternative pollution data source to estimate the value of clean air to residents of Mexico
City. Previous studies have investigated using AOD as a proxy for ground-based air
pollution monitoring in a variety of contexts (Foster et al. 2009, Gutierrez 2009, Chu
2006, Kumar et al. 2007). To our knowledge, this is the first analysis that uses AOD in a
hedonic framework. To show how AOD can be used for hedonic analysis, we use Mexico
City, which has ground based monitoring stations, allowing us to compare our results to
Fontenla et al. (2019), which conducts a similar analysis using particulate matter (PM10).
In this manner, our current work provides evidence that supports the use of AOD across
other areas in Mexico and the developing world that lack monitoring stations. To perform
this analysis, we assemble a highly unique dataset that combines AOD from satellite
imagery, rainfall information from ground-level weather stations, and actual housing
transactions that contain the physical characteristics of the house, price, and the
socioeconomic characteristics of the households.
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2.2. Materials and Methods
We use a unique dataset from Mexico's Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal, which
includes actual home mortgage originations in Mexico City between January 2003 and
May 2004. Table 2.1 provides the summary statistics for our main variables used. The
data includes housing characteristics, wages, and socioeconomic variables of the
purchasing household. A benefit of actual household level data is that it eliminates the
need to estimate average city-level housing prices and wages.
For our pollution measure, we use an AOD 3-kilometer resolution from NASA’s
MODIS satellite (Levy et al. 2019). It comes from the recently released Collection 6.1
that uses Dark Target algorithms, providing daily atmospheric aerosol images. Taken in
5-minute swaths, the images are processed and gridded at multiple spatial resolutions to
estimate the AOD for each cell. Figure 2.1 provides an example of a daily swath at the
three-kilometer resolution covering the study area. AOD is a dimensionless measurement
of the amount of aerosols in a given column of atmosphere. Low values such as 0.01
indicate clean air while a more polluted, hazy atmosphere would be associated with
values of 0.4 or more. (Radcliff et al. 2016). Mexico City's average AOD for our period
of study is 0.3, with a maximum reading of 0.69. In comparison, the average aerosol
optical depth for the U.S. is around 0.1. We standardize the AOD measures to zero-mean
and standard deviation of one to facilitate interpretation of results.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics.
Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

48,748.77

17,734.24

20,380.84

140,519.40

Average Monthly
House Payment (US$)a,

489.03

177.11

115.94

1,717.25

Built Size (m2)

70.58

17.25

34.38

136.42

Lot Size (m2)

111.04

150.46

45.00

1038.00

Bedrooms

2.64

0.59

1

3

Bathrooms

1.26

0.43

1

2.5

Parking

0.76

0.59

0

2

2,816.05

1,618.34

870.47

17,822.79

Age (Household Head)

37.73

8.55

21

61

Number of Dependents

1.18

1.21

0
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Male (Household
Head)

0.63

0.48

0

1

Married

0.55

0.49

0

1

College and Above
(Household Head)

0.56

0.50

0

1

Environmental
Variables
AODc

0.30

0.099

0.090

0.63

Rainfallc (mm)

2.34

2.40

0

12.61

Housing
Housing Value (US$)a

b

Socioeconomic
Variables
Household Monthly
Income (US$)a

2019 US$
Average mortgage length is approximately 25 years
c
Non-standardized AOD and rainfall are measured as the 24-hour, 30-day average
a
b
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Figure 2.1. Example of MODIS 3-kilometer aerosol optical depth five-minute
swath over study area.
A main shortcoming of using aerosol data is that the sensor is unable to get a
reading when there is cloud cover. Clouds could potentially impact AOD in conflicting
ways that would not be necessarily revealed in the data. Rain, associated with clouds, is
known to reduce air pollution by scrubbing it out of the air (Barmpadimos et al. 2011).
However, pollutants can also be trapped below the cloud layer, reducing air quality.
Overall, Kaufman and Koren (2006) find that cloud cover is associated with increased
levels of AOD. This would suggest that our results may actually understate the value
people place on clean air when using AOD as a pollution measure. We attempt to
minimize this concern by averaging a 3x3 grid surrounding each cell of interest to
provide a daily AOD estimate for each household. Expanding our coverage area allows
us to capture pollution around the household even if there are cells with missing data.
Since Mexico City covers over 1,400 km2, the area covered by the 3x3 cells still allows
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for variation in pollution throughout the city. Finally, we calculate a 30-day average, sixmonth lag relative to the closing date. This provides an estimate of the air pollution
experienced by the buyers during the house searching process, as the average search to
closing time is approximately six months.
We instrument for pollution with rainfall data. Through the process of wet
deposition, rain removes particulate matter from the atmosphere, impacting visible
pollution levels and overall perceptions of air quality (Dunlap and York 2008). We
consider rain a plausible exogenous instrument due to its direct impact on air pollution
and limited to no influence on people’s decision of where to live or work in Mexico City.
While precipitation could be considered an amenity that may affect housing and labor
market decisions, it should not be a concern in our case. First, our study focuses on a
single city without the large variations in rainfall that may affect studies that compare
cities across large distances. Second and more importantly, if rain acts as an amenity, it
would have an opposite welfare effect than pollution. High rain would be considered a
negative amenity in an urban setting void of agriculture, whereas it has a positive effect
on air quality. In this case, our estimates could be considered a lower bound on the effects
of pollution on welfare.
Using daily rainfall data from the National Water Commission (CONAGUA
2008) ground-based weather monitoring stations throughout Mexico City, we identify all
stations located within 10 km of the centroid of a household's postal code and apply an
inverse-weight distance method to calculate a daily rainfall estimate for each location.
We then compute the corresponding 30-day average to the AOD estimates.
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We employ a dual sorting hedonic model to estimate the value that residents of
Mexico City place on clean air, which is teased out from household’s choices on where to
work and live. Economic theory suggests that households need to be compensated to
endure air pollution through lower house prices and higher wages.
Our empirical estimation follows that in Fontenla et al. (2019).1 We use a threestage least squares (3-SLS) estimation due to the possible simultaneity in the decisionmaking process of home buying and employment, allowing the disturbances to be
correlated. In order to address endogeneity, we instrument for air pollution with rainfall.
This provides the following system of equations to estimate the impact of pollution
(AOD) on both house prices and wage:
ln#ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒!"# , = 𝛼$ + 𝛼% 𝐴𝑂𝐷"# + 𝛼& 𝑌! + 𝛼' 𝑋" + 𝜓# + 𝛿( + 𝜖%!"#
ln#𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒!"# , = 𝛽$ + 𝛽% 𝐴𝑂𝐷"# + 𝛽& 𝑌! + 𝜓# + 𝛿( + 𝜖&!"#
𝐴𝑂𝐷"# = 𝛾$ + 𝛾% ln#𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙"# , + 𝜓# + 𝛿( + 𝜖'"#

(1)
(2)
(3)

where 𝑖, 𝑗, and 𝑘 represent the household, residence, and zip code, respectively. We
account for a number of housing characteristics in vector 𝑋" , and socioeconomic variables
of the household in vector 𝑌! . In addition, we use spatial fixed effects, 𝜓# , at the zip code
level to minimize spatial autocorrelation, account for geographical unique characteristics
of each neighborhood, and help control for neighborhood attributes that remain consistent
over time. Finally, the monthly dummies 𝛿( control for seasonality in the variables.
2.3. Results
Table 2.2 presents the coefficient estimates from the 3-SLS model estimating
equations (1) – (3). First-stage results support the relevance and validity of our
1

See Fontenla et al (2019) for greater detail of the empirical estimation and data description.
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instrument.2 The main results indicate that air pollution has the hypothesized impacts on
both housing prices and wages. The estimated coefficients of -0.0386 and 0.0681 are
significant and exhibit the expected signs, suggesting that as AOD levels increase,
households are compensated via lower house prices and higher wages, respectively. A
10% increase in AOD results in a 1.3% reduction in house prices and 2.3% increase in
wages.

Table 2.2. 3SLS estimated results of AOD impacts on housing prices and wages.

AOD

House Price

Wage

-0.0386**

0.0681**

(0.0157)

(0.0337)

AOD

0.183***

Wage

(0.0533)
-0.231***

Rainfall

(0.0153)
R-Squared

0.797

0.428

0.577

Observations

1231

1231

1231

Standard errors in parentheses

*

p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Our results stand up to robustness checks where we employ different model
specifications and controls.3 Using PM10 as the pollution measure, Fontenla et al (2019)

2

We use a 2-SLS specification to estimate the Kleibergen-Paap statistic, where we get an F-value of
282.57, indicating rainfall is a relevant instrument. Further, to be able to perform the overidentification test,
we add rainfall lagged by 1 month as a second instrument. The Hansen J statistic supports the validity of
our instruments. Results available upon request.
3

OLS, 2-SLS, and results with additional controls available upon request.
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find that a 10% increase in PM10 leads to a 2.8% decrease in home prices and a 15%
increase in wages. While the impacts on home prices are similar it is worth noting that
the wage increase for AOD is considerably lower. This could be a product from the
issues of using remotely sensed data discussed earlier where data are not available on
cloudy days. One possible explanation is that Mexico City often experiences inversions
trapping in dirty air with a layer of clouds. In this situation, heavily polluted days would
not be captured by satellite but would be measured by ground monitors. Therefore, we
believe that AOD would provide a lower estimate of the impact of pollution in this
scenario.

2.4. Conclusion
Our results indicate that for our particular study area, aerosol optical depth can serve as a
viable proxy for the ground-based air pollution monitoring and that there are other
possible new applications such as hedonic analysis. Consistent with previous results that
use PM10, when using AOD as a measure of air pollution people must be compensated to
endure lower air quality either through lower home prices or higher wages. This provides
further support that air quality is important to the citizens in developing nations and
should be considered in policy decisions.
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CHAPTER 3
The Impact of Daylight Saving Time in Mexico

3.1. Introduction
Occasionally, there are existing policies which remain a legacy of a previous era
that warrant investigation into their continued efficacy. As society changes there
becomes merit in studying these concepts that were once beneficial under particular
circumstances. One policy that continues to gain great scrutiny in both the public and
academic arena is the use of Daylight Saving Time (DST). Initially implemented as an
energy saving measure shifting a majority of human activity during daylight hours and
reducing the energy demand of lighting, the policy has been adopted by a number of
countries where it still remains in effect. Energy savings aside, there is a peripheral body
of literature focusing on the secondary impacts of DST that can come at significant social
costs.
A number of studies have analyzed the validity of DST reducing energy
consumption, often with conflicting results (for example see Havranek, Herman, and
Irsova 2018). However, more recently, greater attention has been given to unforeseen
secondary impacts, ranging from automobile accidents to health implications from
chronobiological interruptions (A. C. Smith 2016; Fritz et al. 2020). Beyond the
economic costs associated with the logistics of changing the clocks twice a year, the
social costs attributed to externalities of DST have been shown to be substantial (Toro,
Tigre, and Sampaio 2015; A. C. Smith 2016).
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The goal of this study is to estimate a portion of the social cost attributed to the
Daylight Saving Time policy in Mexico. To assess this impact, we focus on three major
secondary impacts from DST as shown by previous studies: automobile, acute
myocardial infarctions (AMI), and crime related fatalities. While there exist several other
potential impacts, we believe these three provide profound insight and capture a
significant portion of the social costs associated with DST in Mexico. We estimate these
costs using a regression discontinuity design for 20 years of data, taking advantage of the
exogenous shock of shifting the clocks in both the spring and fall.
We feel this study contributes to the increasing DST literature by providing a
comprehensive case study in a developing nation using multiple impacts. Mexico
provides an ideal setting with an emerging economy, ties close to the U.S., and covers a
wide range of the mid-latitudes. These factors provide the locale for a unique
background that may differ from previous studies focused on more developed, northern
countries. We also expand upon a study by Salas Rodriguez and Hancevic (2020) who
estimated the impacts of DST on traffic accidents in urban Mexico, by extending the
focus to the entire country, not just large municipalities. Also, to our knowledge, there
have not been any studies regarding DST impact on AMI and crime related fatalities in
Mexico.
Our results suggest that there are indeed significant social costs to Daylight
Saving Time in Mexico. Regarding automobile fatalities, we find evidence of a
significant increase during both the spring and fall transitions ranging from thirteen to
twenty-seven percent. This is in contrast with other studies that find either no impact
(Salas Rodriguez and Hancevic 2020) or an increase only in the spring (A. C. Smith
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2016). Our results suggest that there could be two different but equally important
mechanisms of sleep deprivation and level of ambient daylight during the day. In
addition, crime related fatalities significantly increase around the fall transition by almost
16%. This is true for both urban areas and the entire country. Finally, there is some
evidence that fatalities from AMIs increase by approximately 4.5% around DST. This is
only for urban areas during the spring transition which is lower but similar to what Toro,
Tigre, and Sampaio (2015) estimate for Brazil. These findings support the idea that there
may be increased physical stress on health as normal sleep patterns are interrupted.
Quick calculations suggest that DST may result in an additional 95-100 deaths per year
due to automobile crashes, AMIs, or crime, resulting in a social cost over $20 million
annually4. These figures show that even at the lower bound there is a much greater social
cost than the economic benefit gained from DST and provides insight in the continuing
discussion regarding DST policy.
3.2. Background
3.2.1. Daylight saving time in Mexico
DST was first adopted in Mexico in 1996. While the initial idea of DST was to
conserve energy, Mexico had an additional incentive of staying in sync with United
States (U.S.), simplifying cross border operations. Mexico followed the U.S. by entering
DST the first Sunday in April and transitioning out the last Sunday in October. The
adoption of DST shifts when ambient light is present during the day, moving more
activity during the daylight. While each location is different Figure 3.1 gives the

4

Based on the value of a statistical life of USD 210,880. (de Lima 2020)
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example of Mexico City on how daylight changes throughout the year. This also
demonstrates the relative stability of day length in Mexico when compared to countries in
greater latitudes.

Figure 3.1. Average day length in Mexico City. (Source: WorldData.info)

Over time, the U.S. has extended the DST time period while Mexico has kept it
the same, creating a slight misalignment. There are a few cases where particular areas of
Mexico deviate from the traditional time frame used throughout most of the country. The
State of Sonora has not observed DST since 1998 as it shares a border with and is closely
connected economically and socially to Arizona, which does not change it clocks as well.
Due to their proximity, towns located within 20 kilometers of the U.S. border (outside of
Sonora) follow the current U.S. DST period from the second Sunday in March until the
first Sunday in November. Finally, Quintana Roo stopped observing DST in 2015 to be
more in sync with the Caribbean countries and adopted Eastern Standard Time. Figure
3.2 shows the current status of DST in Mexico.
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Figure 3.2. Daylight Saving Time in Mexico. (Source: Salas Rodriguez and Hancevic
2020)
Aligning with the U.S. for DST has undoubtedly streamlined activities between
the two countries and provided financial savings. However, when considering the initial
intent, a recent study by Flores and Luna (2019) conducted a study to evaluate the impact
of DST on energy consumption in Mexico. They show evidence that the policy results in
a net savings of approximately 0.5% of total consumption, providing a strong incentive
for Mexico to maintain DST.
3.2.2. Previous Literature
The daylight saving time policy has received a great deal of scrutiny over time
evaluating the efficacy of its initial charge of reducing energy consumption as well as any
secondary impacts. Even during the mid 1970s, evaluating the impact of extending the
DST period, the U.S. government performed internal studies investigating not only if
18

DST saved energy but also if it had any impact on traffic accidents and criminal activity.
Reports indicated there to be no significant difference in power consumption or
secondary impacts during DST as compared to the rest of the year.
However, through the years, data have become more readily available and
comprehensive. Combined with better analytical methodologies, a vast body of literature
has been built up regarding DST. Causality can be teased out of specific nature of the
two different timeframes during the year, allowing studies to identify the impact on
specific outcomes.
Results from an extensive number of studies regarding energy consumption have
been notably mixed. The main premise for DST suggests that shifting the clocks one
hour ahead compared to standard time will hypothetically push more of people’s activity
into the daylight, reducing the need for artificial lighting. Havranek, Herman, and Irsova
(2018) conducted a comprehensive meta-analysis of forty-four studies focused on
estimating the impact of DST on energy consumption worldwide. While results from
these studies ranged from no impact to both positive and negative savings, their mean
estimate showed an overall reduction of energy consumption by 0.34%. However, as
they weigh the results based on best practice methods, they find the average trends
toward zero. Another key finding from the study indicated that geography and location
are important, and that savings are greatest moving further away from the equator.
Complicating matters even more, Shaffer (2019) shows this variability to exist on an
even smaller scale. Conducting the analysis in Canada, he found that even slight
differences in an east-west orientation with various sunrise times and waking hours
within time zones can vary the level of energy demand. Furthermore, Kotchen and Grant
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(2011) suggest the type of energy consumption plays a large role as shifting daylight
hours may reduce lighting requirements but trades off with an increase in heating and
cooling. They used a natural experiment showing this for Indiana, estimating that DST
actually costs the state $9 million instead of being a net savings.
Specific to Mexico, as mentioned earlier, the most in depth study by Flores and Luna
(2019) recently showed DST resulted in a net reduction in energy consumption by 0.5%.
However, an important finding they discovered is that this is not temporally heterogenous
over the entire time period. The earlier months tended to show less of a decrease in
consumption as compared to second half.

3.2.2.1. Daylight Saving Time and Automobile Fatalities
There have been a number of studies attempting to understand the impact of DST on
automobile crashes and fatalities with mixed results. The exogenous shift of time
forward and backward by an hour has the potential to create hazardous conditions such as
sleep disruption and immediate ambient light shifts. Smith (2016) found there to be a
significant increase in traffic fatalities for the spring transition but no change for the fall.
He also suggested that sleep deprivation accounted for the increase while ambient light
conditions simply shifts when the fatalities occur. A report for the Road Safety Authority
of Ireland (Sarma and Carey 2015) found similar results with an increase in both
automobile collisions and casualties in the seven weeks following the spring transition.
However, they found this to be true for the fall transition as well.
In contrast to these studies, Salas Rodriguez and Hancevic (2020) find DST has no
effect on fatalities in Mexican metropolitan areas. Interestingly, they found that overall
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traffic accidents are actually reduced during the spring transition. This finding is
supported by (Laliotis, Moscelli, and Monastiriotis 2019) who found that in Greece
spring transition saw a reduction in serious accidents and a slight increase in the fall.
Both these studies demonstrate the impact of transitioning light availability in the day
which could create more hazardous conditions either for the morning or evening
commutes.

3.2.2.2. Daylight Saving Time and Acute Myocardial Infarctions
There have been a number of different studies linking an increase in acute myocardial
infarctions to the transition into DST. In a meta-analysis of seven papers, results showed
there to be a modestly significant increase in AMI risk in the week following the spring
transition. However, there was no impact around in the fall (Manfredini et al. 2019). The
spring increase in AMI is speculated to be a result of the disruption of an individual’s
circadian rhythm and sleep pattern. This condition combined with any sympathetic
stressor can lead to increased blood pressure and heart rate (Manfredini et al. 2019).
Specifically, Toro, Tigre, and Sampaio (2015) studied the impact of DST on acute
myocardial infarctions in Brazil. Using a RDD design they find a jump of 7.4-8.5% in
AMI incidence during the spring transition in states that practice DST and no significant
increase in those states that do not. Their rough calculation suggests this translates into
approximately 196.35 deaths annually and social cost of $7.9 to $19.6 billion over a 10year period.
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3.2.2.3. Daylight Saving Time and Crime Related Fatalities
Ambient light has been shown to be a deterrent to violent crime as it increases the
possibility of detection when compared to darkness. By shifting an hour of light to the
evening during DST the hypothesis is that the increase in ambient light in known hours of
criminal activity should reduce these acts. This was shown to be the case with a 7%
reduction in robbery rates after the spring transition throughout over 550 jurisdictions
across the U.S. (Doleac and Sanders 2015). Domínguez and Asahi (2019), in a study
based in Chile, not only found a decrease in crime in the evening hours during the spring
but found a similar and opposite effect for the fall transition. In addition, they found that
crime was not simply shifted to another time period but actually saw true decreases and
increases. This provides evidence that an increase in dark hours in the fall transition
leads to increased overall crime numbers. Specific to fatalities, Toro, Tigre, and Sampaio
(2019) focused on firearm homicide rates during DST in Brazil. They found that moving
into DST reduces the rate of homicide incidence by 9.6%. When focusing on the fall
transition they found the opposite result with homicides increasing, attributed to a shift in
ambient light. However, overall, their back of the envelope estimation suggests that
5,035 lives were saved from 2006-2015, saving a social cost of $2-5 billion.

3.3. Data
We compile a comprehensive dataset of outcome specific fatalities for the entire
country of Mexico. The data come from the General Directorate of Health Information in
the Mexican Secretaria de Salud which includes all recorded fatalities across Mexico
(Central Directorate of Health Information 2020). Each observation is recorded at the
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individual level on a daily resolution providing information on cause, location, and the
casualty’s demographics over a twenty-one year timeframe (1998-2018). Each fatality
has been coded in accordance with the World Health Organization’s IDC-10 categories as
to the specific cause, allowing us to isolate the incidences specific to our three outcomes
(World Health Organization 2019). Finally, we assign each observation as being rural or
urban. We divide the dataset into groups based on the location of the fatality within
Mexico with locales exceeding 100,000 people considered as urban.
We separate out automobile fatalities from the general category of transport
accidents, focusing on all incidences that are considered as on-land and traffic related.
This includes any accident involving single or multiple vehicles caused by a multitude of
reasons. We discard any incidences that are only considered water or air transport, and
anything specifically considered off-road in all-terrain vehicles. However, we include all
occurrences on any road type both in rural and urban areas.
For acute myocardial infarctions, we include all AMI caused fatalities that were
considered acute or relatively time adjacent around our dates of interest. Long lasting
battles stemming from an AMI that may have originated around DST transition dates
were eliminated from the dataset due to concerns of possible confounding medical or
environmental factors. We feel this provides the best estimate of the true direct impact of
DST on AMI.
Finally, we consider criminal fatalities as all assaults that lead to at least one
casualty. We do not differentiate between the wide assortment of methods by which the
assault was conducted, including diverse categories ranging from firearms to poisoning.
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Finally, we do not make a distinction as to if the fatality was of initial intent or a
secondary result of other crime related activities.
3.4. Empirical Model
In order to understand the potential impacts of DST on our three outcomes of
interest, we take advantage of the exogenous shock of shifting the clocks into and out of
DST. The arbitrary, yet consistent, transition of time one hour ahead in the spring and
one hour back in the fall creates a distinct point in time at which we can analyze trends in
fatalities both before and after. Therefore, we use a regression discontinuity (RD) design
framework where the fundamental assumption is that normally the outcome variables
would be a continuous function around a particular point or value. Deviation from this
assumption would suggest there is a causal effect generating this discontinuity.
Therefore, our RD specification estimation becomes:

𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠)* = 𝛽$ + 𝛽% 𝐷𝑆𝑇)* + 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)*
+ 𝐷𝑆𝑇)* 𝑋 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)* + 𝜖)*

(1)

where the outcome is the log total fatalities on day, 𝑑, in year, 𝑦, for one of our three
variables of interest. Following Smith (2016) we demean our fatality counts using day of
week, year, and location to remove any spatial or temporal trends. 𝐷𝑆𝑇)* is a dummy
variable that takes on the value of one if the casualty occurs during DST or zero
otherwise. Therefore, 𝛽% becomes our main coefficient of interest as it indicates the
impact that DST has on the outcome variable. DaysToTransition is our running variable
and gives the number of days the date of the fatality is away from either the spring or fall
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transition. This takes on either a negative or positive number depending on if the fatality
occurred prior to or after the transition date, respectively.
Similar to previous studies using an RD design, we follow the general RD
specification presented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) to estimate the impact
DST has on our outcomes of interest. Not only does their method (program provided in
STATA) find the optimal number of days before and after the transition date (for both
fall and spring) through their optimal bandwidth selector, but it also allows for the
selection of the order of polynomials for the running variable and how to weight the
selection of bandwidth. Based on previous research regarding the proper polynomial
selection for a model and for direct comparison to earlier studies we use a local linear
approach in our analyses (Gelman and Imbens 2019; A. C. Smith 2016). For the same
reason, we use a uniform weighting process in the bandwidth selector (Imbens and
Lemieux 2008; A. C. Smith 2016)
We carry out our analyses at three different levels: the entire country, urban only,
and rural only. From this we hope to distinguish any differences in the impact of DST
between rural and urban locations. Further, we can potentially identify which regions are
driving the overall results in Mexico also providing insight as to potential mechanisms.
Similar to Smith (2016) we conduct sensitivity analyses to support that our findings are in
fact due to DST and not some other cause by running estimations using a proxy start and
end date, alternative model specifications, and focusing on the State of Sonora which
does not practice DST.
As previously mentioned, all observations in states that do not observe DST are
ignored for the main analyses. This includes the states of Sonora after 1998 and Quintana
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Roo after 2015. In addition, following Salas Rodriguez and Hancevic (2020), we decide
to eliminate any year where the spring transition falls within one week of Easter. Being
an important holiday in Mexico, many people will alter normal schedules, increasing
activities and travel which may influence our results.
3.5. Results
To help visualize any impacts that DST may have on automobile, AMI, and crime
related fatalities, Figure 3.3 plots the residuals from the RD analysis against the number
of days from transition for both the spring and fall. A sharp discontinuity around the
transition date would provide evidence that a DST related mechanism is impacting the
number of fatalities. Figure 3.3 shows the possibility of a continuous break in a few
cases. For auto fatalities there appears to be an increase in number after both the spring
and fall transition. Additionally, there looks to be a large increase in crime related
fatalities around the fall transition. And finally, AMI fatalities show a slight uptick
around the spring transition only. Interestingly, there appears to be a general increase in
AMI fatalities in the fall as well, but it does not appear to be any break in the continuous
function. In other words, the number of fatalities seems to peak around the transition
date but does not seem to be triggered by it.
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Figure 3.3. Residual plots around DST spring and fall transitions for auto, crime, and
AMI fatalities.

3.5.1. Automobile Fatalities
Table 3.1 shows the results from the regressions using auto fatalities as the
outcome. We find significant evidence of increased fatalities for both the spring and fall
transitions ranging from 13% to 27%. This is consistent for the fall when considering
both the entire country and focusing on metropolitan areas only, but interestingly not on
rural roadways. However, this actually switches in the spring where the increase in
traffic fatalities is significant for the entire country and rural areas only. This suggests
that many of the accidents are driven by the rural areas or on roads connecting
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metropolitans, such as highways. In this case, there is often higher speed driving that
could possibly be more impacted by the shifting of light.

Table 3.1. Estimates of DST impact on auto fatalities for spring and fall transitions.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
Auto
Fatalities
Spring

(2)
Auto
Fatalities
Fall

(3)
Urban Auto
Fatalities
Spring

(4)
Urban Auto
Fatalities
Fall

(5)
Rural Auto
Fatalities
Spring

(6)
Rural Auto
Fatalities
Fall

0.144**
(0.0612)

0.126**
(0.0548)

0.0775
(0.0736)

0.267***
(0.0909)

0.1752**
(0.08436)

0.0557
(0.075)

7,668

6,175

7,626

6,183

7,635

Observations
6,208
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Our results come in contrast to other similar studies. While Smith (2016) found
that traffic fatalities increased for the spring transition, he found no significant results for
the fall. One possible reason for this difference is that he found the mechanism driving
fatal crashes was due to sleep deprivation and not ambient light shifts. It would then
make sense that this would not be of concern in the fall transition as people actually gain
an hour of sleep in the fall (which could suggest a decrease in fatal accidents). What our
results suggest is that ambient lighting may become a factor, especially in rural areas,
where artificial lighting may not be as prevalent. The combination of DST being
extended another month in the US and daylight becoming much shorter in duration may
reduce the impact that shifting an hour in the fall has on driving fatalities. However, in
Mexico, the fall transition may impact evening traffic more significantly.
More closely related, Rodriguez and Hancevic (2020) suggest that DST has no
impact on the number of traffic related fatalities in Mexico. However, as previously
mentioned, they used a very different dataset that focused only on larger metropolitan
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areas. Highlighting their own limitations, the dataset most likely underrepresented the
total fatalities throughout Mexico. Further, we found evidence that rural areas drive up
fatalities nationwide which would not have been detected in their study.
3.5.2. Crime-related Fatalities
Further results from the RD regressions indicate an increase in crime related
fatalities only around the fall transition, shown in Figure 3.2. Despite there only being a
shift of one hour, there appears to be a significant break in the temporal trend of crime
related fatalities around DST. One suggestion for this is that a reduction in ambient light
in the evening during the transition out of DST may lead to an increase in crime
activities. Not unexpectedly, the results indicate that most of the increase in fatalities
occur in urban areas.

Table 3.2. Estimates of DST impact on crime fatalities for spring and fall transitions.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
All Crime
Fatalities
Spring

(2)
All Crime
Fatalities
Fall

(3)
Urban Crime
Fatalities
Spring

(4)
Urban Crime
Fatalities
Fall

(5)
Rural Crime
Fatalities
Spring

(6)
Rural Crime
Fatalities
Fall

0.0542
(0.0348)

0.1579***
(0.03511)

-0.02399
(0.0462)

0.13203***
(0.051)

0.018**
(0.0584)

0.159***
(0.0511)

7,670

6,210

7,670

6,210

7,670

Observations
6,210
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Our results show a similar trend to the findings of Toro, Tigre, and Sampaio
(2019) for the fall, however, we do not find the sharp decline in homicides in the spring
as suggested by their study. The ambient light mechanism would suggest that there
should be fewer fatalities from crime during the spring transition as the ambient light
during the evening hours would increase. Interestingly, however, we find no impact of
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DST on fatality numbers for the entire country or when considering just urban areas.
Finally, it is important to note that as these significant increases only occurred in the fall
transition, there is an additional hour in which the homicides could take place on the
night of transition. This could potentially be part of the reason for the increase in
fatalities.
3.5.3. Acute Myocardial Infarctions
When considering acute myocardial infarctions, regression analysis suggests there
appears to be approximately a 4.5% increase in AMIs only during the spring transition in
urban areas (see Table 3.3). Previous research has suggested sleep reduction and
disruption of circadian rhythm patterns to be the main mechanism and is consistent with
other studies that found an increase during the spring transition (Toro et al., 2015).
Finding significant results for only the metropolitan areas is not surprising in that sleep
disruption would most likely have the greatest impact on urban individuals that may have
more strict schedules and stressful lifestyles.

Table 3.3. Estimates of DST impact on AMI fatalities for spring and fall transitions.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
All AMI
Fatalities
Spring

(2)
All AMI
Fatalities
Fall

(3)
Urban AMI
Fatalities
Spring

(4)
Urban AMI
Fatalities
Fall

(5)
Rural AMI
Fatalities
Spring

(6)
Rural AMI
Fatalities
Fall

0.0240
(0.0179)

0.0125
(0.0169)

0.0449**
(0.0228)

0.0170
(0.0218)

0.00855
(0.0258)

0.0174
(0.0226)

7,670

6,210

7,670

6,210

7,670

Observations
6,210
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.6. Robustness Tests
To help support our results, we run a sensitivity analysis that includes a number of
robustness and falsification tests to suggest we were not finding spurious results. First, as
previously mentioned our main specification includes a local linear design in accordance
with previous research and believing that the trends in fatalities are close to linear in the
vicinity of the cutoff point. We then relax this and run the same estimations using higher
order (2nd and 3rd) polynomials. Generally, the results, presented in Tables 3.A.1 to 3.A.6
of the appendix, are the same for both the second and third order specifications. In some
cases, we see a change in significance. However, overall direction and magnitude are
similar.
Another fundamental component of the estimation process is selecting the
bandwidth around the transition dates. The Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014)
estimation method allows for a number of data driven bandwidth selection procedures.
We select three additional options to understand if this has any significant impact on our
results. Overall, results are similar even when using different bandwidth selectors as
shown in tables 3.A.7 to 3.A.15 of the appendix. Along with the analyses using
alternative polynomials, these tests provide evidence that our main results are robust to
the estimation specification.
As an additional check, we arbitrarily move the dates of going in and out of DST
with the assumption that we should find no evidence that these artificial dates would have
an impact on fatalities. We chose dates that are thirty and sixty days both before and
after the actual transition day. We feel this distance in time avoids any residual impacts
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on fatalities from DST that could last up to two weeks. Tables 3.A.16 to 3.A.27 of the
Appendix provides the results from the regression analysis using the placebo DST
transition dates. Except for a couple situations that warrant further investigation we find
no relationship between any type of fatalities and the placebo DST transition dates.
As another robustness check, we look only at the State of Sonora and conduct the
same analyses for traffic, AMI, and crime related fatalities. As Sonora does not go on
DST, we should find no evidence of an impact on the number of deaths around the actual
DST transition dates. Tables 3.A.28 to 3.A.30 in the appendix suggest that except for a
couple scenarios there is no immediate change in fatality trends around the country-wide
DST transition dates.
3.7. Conclusion
As times have changed the efficacy of Daylight Saving Time has been debated
worldwide. The policy, adopted in some form by over 70 countries, was intended to
reduce energy consumption shifting more activity into the daylight hours. Recent studies
show this to be true for only a few situations and can vary both geographically and
temporally, with Mexico seeing an overall reduction due to the policy. However, the
unintended consequences of DST may actually come at a greater cost than what may be
saved in energy consumption.
We find in this study that DST leads to a greater number of fatalities due to
increases in automobile crashes, acute myocardial infarctions, and crime related activity.
Using the nature of the spring and fall time changes we are able to tease out the impact of
DST on these outcomes using a regression discontinuity design. A quick estimation
suggests that in just these three areas DST accounts for almost 100 additional and
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avoidable deaths for a social cost of around $20 million annually. Understanding these
unintended costs become essential when guiding policy for countries deciding if they
should adopt or maintain Daylight Saving Time.
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Appendix 3.A: DST Robustness and Falsification Tests
3.A.1. Alternative polynomials

Table 3.A.1. Estimates of DST impact on auto fatalities for spring and fall transitions
using 2nd order polynomials.
VARIABLES

DST

(1)
All Auto
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 2

(2)
All Auto
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 2

(3)
Urban Auto
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 2

(4)
Urban Auto
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 2

(5)
Rural
Auto
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 2

(6)
Rural
Auto
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 2

0.189**
(0.0812)

0.0952
(0.0707)

0.152
(0.103)

0.259**
(0.1102)

0.206*
(0.107)

-0.0763
(0.101)

7,668

6,175

7,626

6,183

7,635

Observations
6,208
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.A.2. Estimates of DST impact on auto fatalities for spring and fall transitions
using 3rd order polynomials.
VARIABLES

DST

(1)
All Auto
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 3

(2)
All Auto
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 3

(3)
Urban Auto
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 3

(4)
Urban Auto
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 3

(5)
Rural
Auto
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 3

(6)
Rural
Auto
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 3

0.172**
(0.0.0805)

0.0275
(0.0747)

0.114
(0.109)

0.285**
(0.128)

0.208*
(0.110)

-0.0846
(0.0979)

7,668

6,175

7,626

6,183

7,635

Observations
6,208
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.A.3. Estimates of DST impact on crime fatalities for spring and fall transitions
using 2nd order polynomials.
VARIABLES

DST

(1)
All Crime
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 2

(2)
All Crime
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 2

(3)
Urban
Crime
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 2

(4)
Urban
Crime
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 2

(5)
Rural
Crime
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 2

(6)
Rural
Crime
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 2

0.0562
(0.0427)

0.192***
(0.0457)

0.0364
(0.0663)

0.195***
(0.0627)

0.192**
(0.0821)

0.198***
(0.0644)

7,670

6,210

7,670

6,210

7,670

Observations
6,210
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.A.4. Estimates of DST impact on crime fatalities for spring and fall transitions
using 3rd order polynomials.
VARIABLES

DST

(1)
All Crime
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 3

(2)
All Crime
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 3

(3)
Urban
Crime
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 3

(4)
Urban
Crime
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 3

(5)
Rural
Crime
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 3

(6)
Rural
Crime
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 3

0.0777
(0.0484)

0.200***
(0.0483)

0.0612
(0.0760)

0.2137***
(0.0661)

0.205**
(0.0892)

0.202***
(0.0739)

7,670

6,210

7,670

6,210

7,670

Observations
6,210
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.A.5. Estimates of DST impact on AMI fatalities for spring and fall transitions
using 2nd order polynomials.
VARIABLES

DST

Observations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

All AMI
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 2

All AMI
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 2

Urban AMI
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 2

Urban AMI
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 2

Rural AMI
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 2

Rural AMI
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 2

0118

0.000966

0.0525**

0.00073

0.00859

-0.00433

(0.0224)

(0.0248)

(0.0246)

(0.0300)

(0.0285)

(0.0348)

6,210

7,670

6,210

7,670

6,210

7,670

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.A.6. Estimates of DST impact on AMI fatalities for spring and fall transitions
using 3rd order polynomials.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

VARIABLES

All AMI
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 3

All AMI
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 3

Urban AMI
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 3

Urban AMI
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 3

Rural AMI
Fatalities
Spring
Poly 3

Rural AMI
Fatalities
Fall
Poly 3

DST

0.00210

0.0118

0.0356

-0.00496

-0.0172

-0.0057

(0.0259)

(0.0224)

(0.0280)

(0.0312)

(0.0376)

(0.04342)

6,210

7,670

6,210

7,670

6,210

7,670

Observations

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

38

3.A.2. Alternative bandwidth selectors
Table A.7. Estimates of DST impact on auto fatalities for spring and fall transitions using
the MSETWO (two different mean square error) optimal bandwidth selector.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
All auto
fatalities
Spring
Band:
MSETWO

(2)
All auto
fatalities
Fall
Band:
MSETWO

(3)
Urban auto
fatalities
Spring
Band:
MSETWO

(4)
Urban auto
fatalities
Fall
Band:
MSETWO

(5)
Rural auto
fatalities
Spring
Band:
MSETWO

(6)
Rural auto
fatalities
Fall
Band:
MSETWO

0.112*
(0.0664)

0.118***
(0.0430)

0.0244
(0.0650)

0.182***
(0.0586)

0.186**
(0.0752)

0.0589
(0.0588)

7,668

6,175

7,626

6,183

7,635

Observations
6,208
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.A.8. Estimates of DST impact on auto fatalities for spring and fall transitions
using the CERRD (common coverage error-rate) optimal bandwidth selector.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
All auto
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERRD

(2)
All auto
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERRD

(3)
Urban auto
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERRD

(4)
Urban auto
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERRD

(5)
Rural auto
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERRD

(6)
Rural auto
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERRD

0.126
(0.0795)

0.106*
(0.0617)

0.0888
(0.0968)

0.277**
(0.107)

0.188*
(0.0106)

0.0381
(0.0834)

7,668

6,175

7,626

6,183

7,635

Observations
6,208
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.A.9. Estimates of DST impact on auto fatalities for spring and fall transitions
using the CERSUM (common coverage error-rate for sum or regression estimates)
optimal bandwidth selector.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
All auto
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERSUM

(2)
All auto
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERSUM

(3)
Urban auto
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERSUM

(4)
Urban auto
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERSUM

(5)
Rural auto
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERSUM

(6)
Rural auto
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERSUM

0.142*
(0.0728)

0.121*
(0.0625)

0.0888
(0.0968)

0.277*
(0.107)

0.180***
(0.103)

0.0149
(0.0847)

7,668

6,175

7,626

6,183

7,635

Observations
6,208
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.A.10. Estimates of DST impact on crime fatalities for spring and fall transitions
using the MSETWO (two different mean square error) optimal bandwidth selector.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)

(2)

All crime
fatalities
Spring
Band:
MSETWO
0.0454
(0.0374)

Observations
6,940
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All crime
fatalities
Fall
Band:
MSETWO

(3)
Urban
crime
fatalities
Spring
Band:
MSETWO

(4)
Urban
crime
fatalities
Fall
Band:
MSETWO

(5)
Rural
crime
fatalities
Spring
Band:
MSETWO

(6)
Rural
crime
fatalities
Fall
Band:
MSETWO

0.0665***
(0.0249)

0.0308
(0.0436)

0.0087
(0.0328)

0.160***
(0.0536)

0.116***
(0.0359)

7,670

6,210

7,670

6,210

7,670
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Table 3.A.11. Estimates of DST impact on crime fatalities for spring and fall transitions
using the CERRD (common coverage error-rate) optimal bandwidth selector.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)

(2)

All crime
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERRD
0.07762
(0.0489)

Observations
6,940
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All crime
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERRD

(3)
Urban
crime
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERRD

(4)
Urban
crime
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERRD

(5)
Rural
crime
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERRD

(6)
Rural
crime
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERRD

0.167***
(0.0414)

0.0200
(0.0656)

0.173***
(0.0619)

0.256***
(0.0717)

0.152**
(0.0655)

7,670

6,210

7,670

6,210

7,670

Table 3.A.12. Estimates of DST impact on crime fatalities for spring and fall transitions
using the CERSUM (common coverage error-rate for sum or regression estimates)
optimal bandwidth selector.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)

(2)

All crime
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERSUM
0.0422
(0.0454)

Observations
6,940
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All crime
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERSUM

(3)
Urban
crime
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERSUM

(4)
Urban
crime
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERSUM

(5)
Rural
crime
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERSUM

(6)
Rural
crime
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERSUM

0.148***
(0.0388)

0.0200
(0.0656)

0.138**
(0.0559)

0.168***
(0.0645)

0.192***
(0.0583)

7,670

6,210

7,670

6,210

7,670
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Table 3.A.13. Estimates of DST impact on AMI fatalities for spring and fall transitions
using the MSETWO (two different mean square error) optimal bandwidth selector.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
All AMI
fatalities
Spring
Band:
MSETWO

(2)
All AMI
fatalities
Fall
Band:
MSETWO

(3)
Urban AMI
fatalities
Spring
Band:
MSETWO

(4)
Urban AMI
fatalities
Fall
Band:
MSETWO

(5)
Rural AMI
fatalities
Spring
Band:
MSETWO

(6)
Rural AMI
fatalities
Fall
Band:
MSETWO

-.00369
(0.0210)

0.00887
(0.018)

0.0322
(0.0205)

0.0043
(0.0289)

0.00648
(0.0235)

0.00693
(0.0265)

7,670

6,210

7,670

6,210

7,670

Observations
6,210
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.A.14. Estimates of DST impact on AMI fatalities for spring and fall transitions
using the CERRD (common coverage error-rate) optimal bandwidth selector.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
All AMI
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERRD

(2)
All AMI
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERRD

(3)
Urban AMI
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERRD

(4)
Urban AMI
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERRD

(5)
Rural AMI
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERRD

(6)
Rural AMI
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERRD

0.00769
(0.0232)

0.00895
(0.0209)

0.0282
(0.0282)

0.0171
(0.0264)

-0.0160
(0.0324)

0.00137
(0.0285)

7,670

6,210

7,670

6,210

7,670

Observations
6,210
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.A.15. Estimates of DST impact on AMI fatalities for spring and fall transitions
using the CERSUM (common coverage error-rate for sum or regression estimates)
optimal bandwidth selector.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
All AMI
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERSUM

(2)
All AMI
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERSUM

(3)
Urban AMI
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERSUM

(4)
Urban AMI
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERSUM

(5)
Rural AMI
fatalities
Spring
Band:
CERSUM

(6)
Rural AMI
fatalities
Fall
Band:
CERSUM

-0.00466
(0.0261)

0.0125
(0.0224)

0.0275
(0.0294)

0.0163
(0.0284)

-0.0126
(0.0343)

0.00671
(0.0301)

7,670

6,210

7,670

6,210

7,670

Observations
6,210
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.A.3. Placebo Start Dates
Table 3.A.16. Estimates of DST impact on auto fatalities using placebo transition dates
60 days earlier.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
All auto
fatalities
Spring
-60 days

(2)
All auto
fatalities
Fall
-60 days

(3)
Urban auto
fatalities
Spring
-60 days

(4)
Urban auto
fatalities
Fall
-60 days

(5)
Rural auto
fatalities
Spring
-60 days

(6)
Rural auto
fatalities
Fall
-60 days

0.00917
(0.0377)

0.0590
(0.0942)

0.0554
(0.0537)

-0.111
(0.0935)

-0.0275
(0.0512)

0.168
(0.113)

7,668
1

6,175
1

7,626
1

6,183
1

7,635
1

Observations
6,208
Polynomial
1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.A.17. Estimates of DST impact on auto fatalities using placebo transition dates
30 days earlier.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
All auto
fatalities
Spring
-30 days

(2)
All auto
fatalities
Fall
-30 days

(3)
Urban auto
fatalities
Spring
-30 days

(4)
Urban auto
fatalities
Fall
-30 days

(5)
Rural auto
fatalities
Spring
-30 days

(6)
Rural auto
fatalities
Fall
-30 days

0.0385
(0.0434)

-0.0126
(0.0402)

-0.0254
(0.0618

0.0847
(0.102)

0.108*
(0.0602)

-0.101
(0.123)

7,668
1

6,175
1

7,626
1

6,183
1

7,635
1

Observations
6,208
Polynomial
1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.A.18. Estimates of DST impact on auto fatalities using placebo transition dates
30 days later.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
All auto
fatalities
Spring
+30 days

(2)
All auto
fatalities
Fall
+30 days

(3)
Urban auto
fatalities
Spring
+30 days

(4)
Urban auto
fatalities
Fall
+30 days

(5)
Rural auto
fatalities
Spring
+30 days

(6)
Rural auto
fatalities
Fall
+30 days

-0.190**
(0.0835)

0.0297
(0.0412)

-0.0588
(0.112)

0.0561
(0.0542)

0.150
(0.119)

0.0162
(0.0604)

7,668
1

6,175
1

7,626
1

6,183
1

7,635
1

Observations
6,208
Polynomial
1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.A.19. Estimates of DST impact on auto fatalities using placebo transition dates
60 days later.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
All auto
fatalities
Spring
+60 days

(2)
All auto
fatalities
Fall
+60 days

(3)
Urban auto
fatalities
Spring
+60 days

(4)
Urban auto
fatalities
Fall
+60 days

(5)
Rural auto
fatalities
Spring
+60 days

(6)
Rural auto
fatalities
Fall
+60 days

0.0103
(0.0670)

0.0743*
(0.0445)

-0.116
(0.0901)

0.129
(0.0835)

0.0250
(0.0894)

0.0398
(0.0608)

7,668
1

6,175
1

7,626
1

6,183
1

7,635
1

Observations
6,208
Polynomial
1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.A.20. Estimates of DST impact on crime fatalities using placebo transition dates
60 days earlier.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)

(2)

All crime
fatalities
Spring
-60 days
0.0453
(0.0286)

Observations
6,210
Polynomial
1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(4)
Urban
crime
fatalities
Fall
-60 days

(5)

(6)

All crime
fatalities
Fall
-60 days

(3)
Urban
crime
fatalities
Spring
-60 days

Rural crime
fatalities
Spring
-60 days

Rural crime
fatalities
Fall
-60 days

-0.0142
(0.0577)

0.0506
(0.0374)

-0.0948
(0.0736)

0.0444
(0.0426)

0.0928
(0.0656)

7,670
1

6,210
1

7,670
1

6,210
1

7,670
1

Table 3.A.21. Estimates of DST impact on crime fatalities using placebo transition dates
30 days earlier.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)

(2)

All crime
fatalities
Spring
-30 days
0.000644
(0.0326)

Observations
6,210
Polynomial
1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(4)
Urban
crime
fatalities
Fall
-30 days

(5)

(6)

All crime
fatalities
Fall
-30 days

(3)
Urban
crime
fatalities
Spring
-30 days

Rural crime
fatalities
Spring
-30 days

Rural crime
fatalities
Fall
-30 days

-0.0361
(0.0409)

-0.0673
(0.0446)

-0.0231
(0.0538)

0.0611
(0.0523)

-0.0337
(0.0636)

7,670
1

6,210
1

7,670
1

6,210
1

7,670
1

45

Table 3.A.22. Estimates of DST impact on crime fatalities using placebo transition dates
30 days later.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)

(2)

All crime
fatalities
Spring
+30 days
-0.110*
(0.0626)

Observations
6,210
Polynomial
1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(4)
Urban
crime
fatalities
Fall
+30 days

(5)

(6)

All crime
fatalities
Fall
+30 days

(3)
Urban
crime
fatalities
Spring
+30 days

Rural crime
fatalities
Spring
+30 days

Rural crime
fatalities
Fall
+30 days

-0.0321
(0.0218)

-0.114
(0.0871)

-0.0164
(0.0328)

-0.156
(0.111)

-0.102
(0.0726)

7,670
1

6,210
1

7,670
1

6,210
1

7,670
1

Table 3.A.23. Estimates of DST impact on crime fatalities using placebo transition dates
30 days later.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)

(2)

All crime
fatalities
Spring
+60 days
-0.0384
(0.0576)

Observations
6,210
Polynomial
1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(4)
Urban
crime
fatalities
Fall
+60 days

(5)

(6)

All crime
fatalities
Fall
+60 days

(3)
Urban
crime
fatalities
Spring
+60 days

Rural crime
fatalities
Spring
+60 days

Rural crime
fatalities
Fall
+60 days

0.0431
(0.0268)

-0.0500
(0.0725)

-0.00329
(0.0406)

-0.00696
(0.0697)

0.179***
(0.0514)

7,670
1

6,210
1

7,670
1

6,210
1

7,670
1
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Table 3.A.24. Estimates of DST impact on AMI fatalities using placebo transition dates
60 days earlier.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
All AMI
fatalities
Spring
-60 days

(2)
All AMI
fatalities
Fall
-60 days

(3)
Urban AMI
fatalities
Spring
-60 days

(4)
Urban AMI
fatalities
Fall
-60 days

(5)
Rural AMI
fatalities
Spring
-60 days

(6)
Rural AMI
fatalities
Fall
-60 days

0.0111
(0.0158)

0.0107
(0.0263)

0.00758
(0.0175)

-0.00566
(0.0277)

-0.0271
(0.0218)

0.0380
(0.0274)

7,670
1

6,210
1

7,670
1

6,210
1

7,670
1

Observations
6,210
Polynomial
1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.A.25. Estimates of DST impact on AMI fatalities using placebo transition dates
30 days earlier.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
All AMI
fatalities
Spring
-30 days

(2)
All AMI
fatalities
Fall
-30 days

(3)
Urban AMI
fatalities
Spring
-30 days

(4)
Urban AMI
fatalities
Fall
-30 days

(5)
Rural AMI
fatalities
Spring
-30 days

(6)
Rural AMI
fatalities
Fall
-30 days

0.0153
(0.0166)

-0.0139
(0.0253)

0.00592
(0.0209)

-0.0193
(0.0321)

0.0238
(0.0222)

-0.0127
(0.0170)

7,670
1

6,210
1

7,670
1

6,210
1

7,670
1

Observations
6,210
Polynomial
1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.A.26. Estimates of DST impact on AMI fatalities using placebo transition dates
30 days later.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
All AMI
fatalities
Spring
+30 days

(2)
All AMI
fatalities
Fall
+30 days

(3)
Urban AMI
fatalities
Spring
+30 days

(4)
Urban AMI
fatalities
Fall
+30 days

(5)
Rural AMI
fatalities
Spring
+30 days

(6)
Rural AMI
fatalities
Fall
+30 days

-0.0414
(0.0376)

-0.0106
(0.0128)

-0.034
(0.0387)

-0.00831
(0.0178)

-0.0402
(0.00345)

-0.0214
(0.0204)

7,670
1

6,210
1

7,670
1

6,210
1

7,670
1

Observations
6,210
Polynomial
1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.A.27. Estimates of DST impact on AMI fatalities using placebo transition dates
60 days later.

VARIABLES
DST

(1)
All AMI
fatalities
Spring
+60 days

(2)
All AMI
fatalities
Fall
+60 days

(3)
Urban AMI
fatalities
Spring
+60 days

(4)
Urban AMI
fatalities
Fall
+60 days

(5)
Rural AMI
fatalities
Spring
+60 days

(6)
Rural AMI
fatalities
Fall
+60 days

-0.0272
(0.0262)

0.0103
(0.0156)

-0.0236
(0.0294)

0.00197
(0.0188)

-0.0838
(0.0519)

-0.0127
(0.0170)

7,670
1

6,210
1

7,670
1

6,210
1

7,670
1

Observations
6,210
Polynomial
1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.A.4. State of Sonora Only
Table 3.A.28. Estimates of DST impact on auto fatalities for State of Sonora only.
VARIABLES

DST

(1)
Auto
Fatalities
Sonora
Spring

(2)
Auto
Fatalities
Sonora
Fall

(3)
Urban Auto
Fatalities
Sonora
Spring

(4)
Urban Auto
Fatalities
Sonora
Fall

(5)
Rural
Auto
Fatalities
Sonora
Spring

(6)
Rural
Auto
Fatalities
Sonora
Fall

0.0436
(0.110)

0.204
(0.148)

-0.125
(0.1092)

-0.165
(0.128)

-0.0971
(0.0914)

0.197
(0.153)

3,713
1

1,760
1

2,185
1

1,907
1

2,320
1

Observations
3,007
Polynomial
1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.A.29. Estimates of DST impact on crime fatalities for State of Sonora only.
VARIABLES

DST

(1)
All Crime
Fatalities
Sonora
Spring

(2)
All Crime
Fatalities
Sonora
Fall

(3)
Urban Crime
Fatalities
Sonora
Spring

(4)
Urban Crime
Fatalities
Sonora
Fall

(5)
Rural
Crime
Fatalities
Sonora
Spring

(6)
Rural
Crime
Fatalities
Sonora
Fall

0.123
(0.070)

0.0757
(0.101)

0.124
(0.0803)

0.00075
(0.103)

0.215*
(0.184)

-0.0002
(0.116)

4,709
1

2,837
1

3,700
1

1,678
1

2.167
1

Observations
3,661
Polynomial
1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.A.30. Estimates of DST impact on AMI fatalities for State of Sonora only.
VARIABLES

DST

(1)
All AMI
Fatalities
Sonora
Spring

(2)
All AMI
Fatalities
Sonora
Fall

(3)
Urban AMI
Fatalities
Sonora
Spring

(4)
Urban AMI
Fatalities
Sonora
Fall

(5)
Rural AMI
Fatalities
Sonora
Spring

(6)
Rural AMI
Fatalities
Sonora
Fall

0.184*
(0.108)

0.103
(0.0885)

0.306*
(0.161)

0.0490
(0.10174)

0.0282
(0.0723)

0.102
(0.0800)

7,568
1

6,945
1

7,309
1

4,773
1

5,931
1

Observations
6,126
Polynomial
1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER 4
Working Together: Optimal Control of Wolf Management Across
Multiple States
4.1. Introduction
The protection of endangered and threatened species is often contentious and
controversial. While most people understand the importance of preserving biodiversity, it
can often place a large burden on specific groups that incur higher costs from the
interaction with these species. Laws providing protection can often result in the loss of
use of natural resources in order to preserve habitat. Individuals may incur direct
financial loss in the form of livestock depredation or crop destruction or even experience
a psychological and emotional hardships. Globally, the benefits of biodiversity are
widely distributed while the costs are often borne by a much smaller group.
An example of this conflict can be seen in the reintroduction and restoration of the
gray wolf in the upper Rocky Mountains (URM). Considered a pest and threat, they were
essentially eradicated from the area since the mid 1940s, giving humans and the
ecosystem time to adapt to the absence of a keystone species. However, the U.S. Fish and
Game decided to bring back wolves to the area starting in 1995. Wolves bring with them
a number of benefits both economic and ecological. Beyond inherent value of their
presence, it has been estimated that wolves account for approximately $34 million dollars
in additional revenue per year for the region from tourism activities (J. W. Duffield,
Neher, and Patterson 2008). Additionally, there is some evidence that wolves have
helped to restore and balance ecosystem functioning (for example see Beyer et al., 2007;
Boyce, 2018). However, with their introduction a number of negative externalities have
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been created resulting in direct economic losses from livestock depredation and weight
reduction, reduced hunting opportunities, and fear of individual safety (Naughton-Treves,
Grossberg, and Treves 2003).
Initially, the United States Fish and Wildlife (USFW) created the management
plan and implemented the reintroduction of the gray wolf into Yellowstone National Park
(YNP) and central Idaho. The plan called for the USFW to establish a healthy population
of wolves in the upper Rocky Mountain area and then turn over the management to the
individual states of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
1987). As each state developed and follows its own management plan, there appears to
be little interaction and cooperation amongst them in the management of wolves.
Therefore, individual states must maintain agencies responsible to manage a species that
does not recognize geographical boundaries.
In this study we try to model and compare the outcomes on efficiency and
effectiveness of wolf management based on whether a state works independently or
jointly with others in the region. First, we develop multiple optimal management paths
using optimal control theory that maximizes the net benefits to society. Theoretically, the
model can indicate differences in optimal paths, highlighting areas that may lead to
greater efficiencies. Second, we use agent-based modeling to empirically evaluate these
multiple scenarios. Using actual costs and revenues associated from the direct impact of
wolves, we create a bioeconomic model that demonstrates the management paths under a
variety of scenarios. While there are many indirect costs and benefits associated with
having the predator species, we focus on measurable outcomes to replicate what wildlife
managers are facing.
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Results from both the theoretical and empirical models indicate efficiencies could
be gained by cooperatively managing wolves. Most notably, and understandably, sharing
management costs and activities across states provide an opportunity to increase overall
economic benefits. Further, we show that with joint cooperation the number of wolves
can be maintained at higher levels ensuring a healthier population. Specifically, we find
the optimal number of wolves for the region to level out at approximately 2,300, almost
400 more than if states work independently. Maintaining this number suggests that
approximately 615 will need to be harvested annually. Finally, we estimate that when
states work together and lower management costs, the net benefit can be increased by
almost $1 million. We believe these results provide important evidence that there are
positive spillover effects from cooperative management of wolves in the URM region
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, to the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to determine an optimal management strategy for the reintroduction and
management of a contentious species throughout the URM region. Second, we use a
novel approach of applying both optimal control theory and system dynamics. Our study
complements and builds upon the recent work by Sims et al. (Sims et al. 2020) that uses a
bioeconomic approach to understanding the impacts on the local economy of delisting the
gray wolf in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. Our model can provide a foundation
upon which managers can build to develop optimal strategies towards wolves and other
important species worldwide.
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 presents the background to the
problem and reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 develops the theoretical optimal
control models for the individual state and the joint-state management model. Section 4
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presents the empirical models and the numerical results. Section 5 presents the
conclusions.

4.2. Background
4.2.1. Study Area
We focus on the three main states of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming that
comprise most of the area of the upper Rocky Mountains and the former range of the
Rocky Mountain Gray wolf. While portions of Washington and Oregon have wolves that
have migrated into the area the numbers remain low. As we are interested in the potential
types of management, we use these three states as the representatives for the URM. The
region is similar to what is often referenced as the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem with
Yellowstone National Park centrally located within the three states.
In Figure 4.1, we show the area of the URM where wolves were historically found
in the URM. Considered a pest species and threat to more desirable species such as elk,
the northern Rocky Mountain wolf was essentially eradicated from the area by the 1930s,
including in YNP and surrounding states. After years of near extinction, in 1974 the gray
wolf in the northern Rocky Mountains was considered to be endangered and placed under
the protection of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
made the decision to restore wolves back into the area, and in 1995 and 1996, introduced
65 wolves into Idaho and YNP. The explosive population growth of wolves in the URM
reached the restoration plan’s goal of maintaining 300 wolves and 30 breeding pairs for
three years in 2002. Reaching this milestone potentially allowed the USFWS to remove
the ESA protections and turn over responsibility to individual states upon approval of
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proposed management plans. However, after many legal battles it was not until 2009 that
the USFWS delisted them in Idaho and Montana. Wyoming’s management plan
remained unsatisfactory to the USFWS and therefore remained in federal control
(International Wolf Center 2019; National Park Service 2018).

Washingto
n

Oregon

Montana

Idaho

Wyoming

Figure 4.1. Historical range of the Rocky Mountain Gray wolf. (USFW 1987)

As part of the management plans, wolves were legally allowed to be hunted to
control population numbers. Idaho and Montana had its first hunting season of wolves in
2009. However, in 2010 a federal judge reinstated ESA protection to the entire URM
banning all hunting. After a year of more legal battles, wolves were once again delisted,
and hunting wolves commenced once again in Idaho and Montana. Wyoming wolves
were eventually delisted in 2012 and management was handed over to the state until 2014
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when authority was taken away and given back to USFWS. It took three years for
Wyoming to get back management of wolves in 2017 (International Wolf Center 2019;
National Park Service 2018).
4.2.2. Benefits and Costs of Wolves
Any optimal management of a wildlife species, especially a top predator, must
consider the benefits and costs associated with their presence. While costs tend to be
more straightforward, usually in economic terms, the difficulty lies in ascertaining the
value of a species. The problem arises that this value can be made up of many different
components from the abstract, ecosystem service and intrinsic value, to monetized
benefits such as park entrance fees or hunting license fees.
Like many keystone species, especially for predators, the removal of the wolf from an
ecosystem can set forward a chain of events that can significantly alter the environment.
Likewise, their introduction or reintroduction into an area in which it has been absent for
a long period of time can have profound impacts as well. Since their eradication around
1926 in the URM area of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming (see Figure 4.1), the ecosystem
went approximately 70 years adapting to the loss of a top predator. Ecological responses
were great with elk populations increasing corresponding to a variety of landscape
changes, including loss of aspen and willow groves and the deterioration of riparian
habitat (Smith & Bangs, 2009).
Since their return and successful establishment over the last 20 years, the
ecosystem has once again adapted. There is evidence that elk populations have been
reduced and are genetically stronger, willow stands are rebounding along with associated
wildlife species, and riparian ecosystems are healthier (Smith and Bangs 2009). While
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causality may be tentative at this point, the biological evidence suggests that wolves play
at least a partial role.
In an attempt to value the gray wolf, there can be a number of approaches. The
direct economic benefits (use-value) stem mainly from wolf-related tourism activities and
hunting license fees. Duffield and Neher (1996) estimated that reintroducing wolves
back into Yellowstone National Park initially brought net benefits to the area in the range
from $5.8 to $9.2 million. This has escalated in recent years to approximately $34
million per year (Duffield et al., 2008). License fees for hunting and trapping of wolves
can generate anywhere from $100,000 to $500,000 annually.
To estimate the non-use values of wolves, studies have focused on a willingness
to pay (WTP) procedure. While this is not enough to evaluate their full worth, it
hopefully identifies intrinsic worth as well as some of the services provided by wolves as
seen by the general public. Chambers and Whitehead (2003) used a contingent valuation
method (CVM) to find a value of $23 for wolves in Minnesota. While Richardson and
Loomis (2009) showed a range of economic value for wolves ranging from $22 to $162,
with an average of $61, through a meta-analysis of a number of studies. Unfortunately,
there have been limited studies specifically for the URM region.
The benefits associated with the presence of wolves need to be compared to the
costs of their management. These mainly arise from management activities by
government agencies along with direct loss of livestock. These costs will obviously
fluctuate with the objectives and by the management plans instituted by each state or
agency. Mech (1999) calculated the overall cost per wolf per year in Minnesota to range
from $71-110 over the 1979-1998 time period, and estimated costs to rise to $146 during
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2001-2005. This included both control related management costs and compensation for
losses incurred by the public. While Chambers and Whitehead (2003) did not calculate a
specific cost per wolf, their analysis of the costs and previously mentioned benefits of
wolf management in Minnesota yielded an overall net benefit.

4.2.3. Dynamic Optimal Control and Bioeconomic Models of Wildlife
A number of studies have used optimal control or bioeconomic models to try and
understand the dynamics of endangered or recovering species. Some studies focus on
population dynamics, others look at the economic drivers, while still others try to
understand the overall relationship between the two. Bioeconomic modeling of natural
species introduces complexities from both the economic and ecological side of the
analysis. Rondueau (2001) illustrates this when he developed an extensive model that
demonstrates the difficulties associated with this type of analysis. He highlights the
issues of determining the net benefits of wildlife species which can lead to shadow prices
that can be either positive or negative.
More recent work by Sims et al. (2020) looks at the economic benefits of delisting
an endangered species. They also focus on wolves in a subsection of the Greater
Yellowstone Ecosystem. Interestingly, they find that there is an economic benefit to the
local region when wolves were delisted from the ESA. However, there is a great deal of
heterogeneity in who incurs the costs and benefits, especially cost savings, from wolf
conservation. They also suggest that programs to compensate individuals that have
losses in the form of livestock depredation should be expanded and possibly fall under
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federal mandate. Doing this would reduce the incentive for states to reduce wolf
populations in an attempt to decrease livestock depredations.
Bodine et al. (2008) focused on augmentation of the species and which
parameters of the environment are key to increasing numbers of individuals. They
understandably find that ecological conditions are important to the management path of
recovering species. Rondeau, (1998) considered the reintroduction of endangered
predators, with the flexibility of allowing for animal augmentation and harvesting, as well
as human-wildlife interactions. This study showed that intense effort of increasing
populations at the beginning is essential and should be followed by active population
control. In other words, the initial “stock” of the population is essential for its long term
survival (Rondeau 1998).
Looking at Stellar sea lions, Finnoff and Tschirhart (2002) extended predator
models in a slightly different form, to consider the impact of reintroduction on prey
species. They looked at the potential indirect economic impacts and incentives of the
complex system of predator/prey, environment, and human activities. Their results show
when the prey of an introduced predator is also shared with human consumption,
conservation efforts become much more difficult and should be considered in policy
development.
Finally, other studies have focused on the economic component related to
endangered species management. Linking human “use” of endangered species through
national park tourism, it has been shown that there is an optimal level of ecotourism in
parks to maximize revenue and conservation efforts (Bednar-Friedl, Behrens, and
Getzner 2012).
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4.3. Theoretical Model
The initial decision to reintroduce wolves into the URM region has been made
and implemented by the federal government. In accordance with the initial management
plan, the success of these activities led to the management authority to be handed over to
the individual states. In adherence to federal guidelines of delisting a species, the states
are now tasked to maximize the benefits to society.
The goal becomes to gain the most social benefits by maximizing direct
economic benefits and minimizing damages and management costs while maintaining a
genetically viable population of wolves. We follow Rondeau (2001), who developed a
more generalized optimal control model for endangered species. However, we extend the
model to include hypothetical joint management of wolves by a number of n states,
where n=1,…,N.
The benefits of wolves range from the non-use values including existence value,
bequest value, provision of ecological services, and recreational activities. Hunting and
closely connected sectors would make up the use value of wolves, however, it should be
noted that this would retract from the existence values for some individuals. These total
benefits can be captured as a function of wolves at time t given by B(w(t)). It is likely
that the marginal benefit of a wolf when populations are low is relatively high but will
taper off as numbers increase. Therefore, it is assumed that the function is increasing and
concave, Bw>0 and Bww<0.
Wolf interactions with human activities will lead to direct damage costs such as
the loss of livestock and pets. The function D(w(t)) is the wolf dependent function of
damage that is assumed to be increasing at an increasing rate. Higher populations will
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increase human-wolf interactions, and inter- and intra-specific competition will lead to
exponentially greater damage as they turn to alternative food sources. Therefore, Dw >0
and Dww>0.
Finally, the cost associated with the management of a species is given by the
function C(m(t)), where m(t) is the level of management “effort” which in this case
translates to population augmentation or harvesting. While this is not a direct cost per se,
this effort can loosely be thought of in a monetary sense, for example the monitoring and
sustaining a target population, relocation and culling, and managing hunting activities.
These costs can be significant, as indicated by a Montana bill appropriating $900,000 per
year for “wolf management” (Bradley et al. 2014). It is important to note that this cost
function is not dependent on wolf populations. Understandably, this overlooks some of
the inherent relationship associated with density, such as repayment of livestock losses
and relocations. However, many of the costs will exist regardless of numbers, including
activities such as monitoring, public outreach, protecting vital areas, and genetic testing.
Therefore, we assume that management efforts are independent of the number of wolves,
and, to keep the model tractable, we assume that it is increasing and convex, Cm>0 and
Cmm>0. The net benefit (NB) from wolves is given by the following equation:
𝑁𝐵(𝑤) = 𝐵#𝑤(𝑡), − 𝐷#𝑤(𝑡), − 𝐶#𝑚(𝑡),

(1)

The population of wolves in a given geographical area is determined by both
biological and anthropogenic factors. Natural population dynamics, unique to every
species, determine its natural rate of increase. This includes birth and death rates,
carrying capacity of the landscape, competition, and predator-prey relationships. While
very complex, this can be simplified to the general function f(w), where the rate of
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increase is a function of the number of wolves. Initially, this function will be highly
simplified in a basic logistic growth function, assuming the carrying capacity will capture
some of the complexities. This could later be refined through empirical studies that have
estimated the natural rate of increase of wolves for unmanaged populations (Mech and
Fieberg 2015).
Human management also plays a significant role in wolf numbers. As evidenced
by their delisting from the ESA, conservation efforts have rebounded wolf populations
from zero to “recovered” in the URM region, after humans essentially eradicated them
from the region decades ago. The current problem that managers face is to maintain
these population levels while balancing the impacts on society. Therefore, management
activities can have positive (e.g. reintroduction, supplementation, protection from
hunting) or negative (e.g. culling, hunting, translocation to other areas) impacts. While
hunting remains a controversial and limited option, government wildlife agencies have
taken lethal measures to control wolf populations (Bradley et al. 2014). However, given
that wolf populations currently are at recovered levels, management may be simply
thought of as a harvesting rate or cost of harvesting. Therefore, the differential equation
that serves as the law of motion equation and represents the change in the number of
wolves over time can be written as:
𝑤̇ = 𝑓(𝑤) + 𝑚

(2)

Equation (2) above implies that the change in the wolf population is equal to the natural
growth function of wolves f(w) plus the management input m, which is the harvesting (or
supplementation).
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We use an optimal control model to determine the best wolf management path
that maximizes the net benefits to society. We develop two separate models to illustrate
the differences between states acting independently versus jointly. Benefits are
maximized indefinitely into the future assuming that society will always choose and
benefit from wolf existence in the region.

4.3.1. Individual State Management
The wolf manager within each state maximizes the infinite discounted value of
the social net benefits given by Equation (1) subject to the law of motion of the wolf
population given by Equation (2) as follows:
.

max W 𝑒 +,- [𝐵#𝑤(𝑡), − 𝐷#𝑤(𝑡), − 𝐶(𝑚(𝑡))]𝑑𝑡
$

s.t.:

𝑤̇ = 𝑓(𝑤) + 𝑚
𝑤(𝑡) ≥ 0
𝑤(0) = 𝑤$ 𝑖𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛

where d is the discount factor and m is the management input (harvesting or
supplementation). As justified by Rondeau (2001), the cost and benefit functions in the
net benefits are inputted separately based on the idea that an existence value for one
person may be a direct loss (of livestock for example) for another.
The current value Hamiltonian becomes:
𝐻 = 𝐵#𝑤(𝑡), − 𝐷#𝑤(𝑡), − 𝐶#𝑚(𝑡), + 𝜇[𝑓(𝑤) − 𝑚]

(3)

The first order conditions are given by the following:
𝐻( = 𝐶( − 𝜇 = 0
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(4)

−𝐻/ = 𝜇̇ − 𝛿𝜇 = −𝐵/ + 𝐷/ − 𝜇(𝑓/ )

(5)

𝐻0 = 𝑤̇ = 𝑓 (𝑤) − 𝑚

(6)

We take the derivative of Equation (4) with respect to time and solve for 𝑚̇ to obtain the
following optimal management path:
𝑚̇ =

𝜇̇
𝐶((

(7)

We substitute 𝜇̇ from Equation (5) and 𝜇 = 𝐶( from Equation (4) into Equation (7) to
obtain the following optimal management or harvesting path of wolves:

𝑚̇ =

𝛿𝜇 − 𝐵/ + 𝐷/ − 𝜇𝑓/ 𝐶( (𝛿 − 𝑓/ ) − 𝐵/ + 𝐷/
=
𝐶((
𝐶((

(8)

4.3.2 Multiple State Joint Management
Although our main motivation is the wolf management in the three states of
Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, we develop a joint management model for n states. In the
numerical section, we perform a numerical simulation for only those three states.
The main idea behind a joint management program is that it could potentially
reduce overall management costs, as redundant activities could be streamlined. Other
benefits from joint management would also include better monitoring and understanding
of wolf population dynamics and movements across the entire region. As wolf
movements often ignore state borders, uncertainty of wolf activity can exist. Improved
networking, outreach, and damage control could also arise from joint efforts. Moreover,
the change in the population would be dependent upon all the wolves in the region.
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When the states work together, the wolf manager maximizes the net social
benefits and wolf population through the following problem:
.

2

max W 𝑒 +,- cd e𝐵#𝑤(𝑡),1 − 𝐷#𝑤(𝑡),1 − 𝐶#𝑚(𝑡),1 f g 𝑑𝑡
$

13%

s.t.:

𝑤1̇ = 𝑓1 (𝑤1 , … , 𝑤2 ) − 𝑚1
𝑤1 (𝑡) ≥ 0
𝑤1 (0) = 𝑤$ 𝑖𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛

Where 𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁 and 𝛿 is the discount factor. The Hamiltonian of the jointmanagement problem is the following:
2

𝐻 = d je𝐵#𝑤(𝑡),1 − 𝐷#𝑤(𝑡),1 − 𝐶#𝑚(𝑡),1 f + 𝜇1 [𝑓1 (𝑤1 , … , 𝑤2 ) − 𝑚1 ]k
13%

Which yields the optimal management paths for each state n of (see Appendix A for the
derivation):
𝐶(! 𝛿 − 𝐵/ 1 + 𝐷/! − ∑2
13% 𝐶( 1 𝑓1,/!
𝑚̇ 1 =
𝐶(! (!

∀ 𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁

(9)

4.3.3. Theoretical Model Individual State Management Results
Equation (8) provides the optimal management path for wolves in a single
management state model. There are different interpretations to the management model,
but it is more accurately represented as that of harvesting wolves. Thus, positive
management is interpreted as the removal of wolves. However, the deviation from 𝑚̇ = 0
in Equation (8) is the more important aspect when it comes to costs. A larger separation
from 𝑚̇ = 0 indicates bigger costs, whether they come from supplementing or harvesting
the population. This path is based on a discounted marginal cost along with the positive
or negative marginal growth, marginal benefit, and marginal damage of wolves.
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Remembering the assumption that Cmm>0, the denominator is positive. Therefore, if the
marginal benefit is low relative to the marginal damage and marginal costs, which would
be the case when wolf populations are high, this would cause m to be positive and of
higher magnitude. The manager should decrease the number of wolves by increasing the
level of harvesting. On the other side, with high marginal benefits assumedly with low
numbers, then the numerator is negative causing m to be negative. At this point
supplementing the population would be the best option.
The dynamics of the system can be illustrated using the two differential equations
from the model to conduct a phase diagram. The 𝑤̇ isocline is just the logistic growth
function when 𝑤̇ = 0. On the other hand, the 𝑚̇ isocline is not. Setting 𝑚̇ = 0 to find
the isocline reveals the following economic equilibrium condition:
𝛿 = 𝑓/ +

𝐵/ − 𝐷/
𝐶(

(10)

where the rate of return for both outside investment and investment in the wolves must be
equal. In other words, the marginal net benefits in relation to management costs along
with the marginal growth rate of wolves must be equal to what would be obtained
elsewhere. The shape of the 𝑚̇ isocline is still ambiguous. The equilibrium level of wolf
harvest and population take place when 𝑤̇ = 0 and 𝑚̇ = 0 cross each other. In Appendix
B, we assume a previously used shape for 𝑚̇ = 0 to show the possible theoretical
solutions to the single and joint-state models.

4.3.4. Theoretical Models Multiple State Joint Management Results
We now consider the situation when the three states work together, and Equation
(9) gives the optimal management path for each state n. While each state is unique, in
65

essence all three act the same way. Therefore, considering one individual state in the
joint management model state shows a similar path as when acting alone, with two
notable differences. Because each optimal path now includes influence from each of the
other two states, the marginal growth and marginal costs for each state is now
incorporated into the decision path. This suggests a spillover effect amongst the
management throughout the region.
These added effects follow similar tradeoffs as in the individual case but now they
apply to the whole region. When wolf numbers are low in a particular state, the marginal
costs are high, and the marginal growth is positive. Moreover, in this case, marginal
benefits are high which would cause 𝑚̇ to be large and negative and expensive for a
given state. However, augmentation to the population can come from surrounding states
from faster population growth or translocation. Therefore, 𝑚̇ in each state is supported
by the other two, spreading some of the “costs”. 5
After a species has recovered and has been delisted, the management burden then
falls mainly on the individual state. Assuming the marginal growth is now negative as
populations are high, most managers are harvesting the population to maximize net
benefits (while minimizing damage costs). Large wolf numbers would suggest greater
damage and management costs. This would cause managers to increase harvesting rates.
Realizing the actions in one state will impact the others, some of the management duties
will fall outside of its borders. The joint control of individual numbers will help reduce a
feeding effect from one state to another, reducing costs throughout the entire region.

5

This occurs under federal protection of the ESA, therefore each state is assisted in these costs externally.
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As in the single state model the 𝑤1̇ isocline is the logistic growth function when
𝑤1̇ = 0. Setting 𝑚̇1 = 0 to find the isocline reveals the following economic equilibrium
condition:
8
7
𝐵/6 " − 𝐷/6 " 𝐶(
𝑔
𝐶(
ℎ
# /"
$ /"
𝛿 = 𝑓/" +
+
+
6
6
6
𝐶(
𝐶(
𝐶(
"
"
"

(11)

As mentioned in the single-state model section, we cannot determine the exact
shape of 𝑚̇1 = 0. In Appendix B, we use a previously assumed shape of 𝑚̇1 = 0 to
illustrate the differences between single and the joint management models.

4.4. Empirical Model
Since the theoretical model does not allow us to obtain all the dynamics of the
single and joint state management problem, we develop a bioeconomic system dynamics
model that can help illustrate the optimal management of wolves under a variety of
scenarios. System dynamics is a derivative of the work developed by Forrester (1971) of
MIT, in which he introduced a methodology that enables modeling systems with
multiloop feedbacks (Sterman 2002; Mamkhezri, Malczynski, and Chermak 2021).
The empirical model attempts to capture the complexity of connecting
population dynamics of wolves to their direct economic impacts, allowing managers to
optimize the net benefit of wolves. To address these interconnected relationships, we
develop a complex system dynamics model. Figure 4.2 provides a simplified
representation of the general model that links wolf population dynamics, management,
economic impacts through policy.
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Figure 4.2. Schematic of bioeconomic model
After we have calibrated the necessary values of the model, we simulated the
dynamics of the model using Powersim Studio, which solves the model using a multiloop
feedback approach. Under this technique, the net benefits are maximized incorporating
the law of motion. Using this information, we estimate a management cost function,
benefit function, and damage function which allows us to find the optimal population and
harvesting ratios. We only consider measurable costs and revenues in our analysis,
including agency management costs, livestock depredations, and license fee revenues.
Unfortunately, due to the lack of information we are unable to include estimates of
indirect costs and benefits such as improved ecosystem services, non-use value, and
increased hardships. However, these can easily be added to the model as data becomes
more readily available.

4.4.1. Methods and Data
Our empirical model incorporates three main components including the biological
population dynamics, direct costs, and benefits of wolves to help understand the complex
nature between management, policy, and societal benefit. We generate a baseline model
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using functional forms that are incorporated into a system dynamics model allowing for
the interconnection of multiple variables under a number of different scenarios. Taking
an agent-based approach, we calibrate the model using actual historical data from the past
20 years (2000 to 2020). This generates a representative and accurate model of historical
trends as well as allowing for future predictions. Further, since there is inherent
uncertainty in the values of some variables, we use Monte Carlo simulations to create
confidence intervals around the output from the model.
In particular, we assume the following functional forms in the empirical model.
For the wolf population dynamics, denoted as 𝑤̇ in the theoretical model, we assume a
logistic growth function. Following standard biological theory where population numbers
initially follow an exponential growth curve, they eventually reach a saturation point, or
carrying capacity, in the environment. This creates an s-shaped curve as the population
growth slows at higher levels due to lack of resources and intra- and interspecific
competition. Therefore, instantaneous growth is dictated by an intrinsic rate of increase,
incorporating complexities such as births and deaths, competition, and carrying capacity.
A significant impact on wolf numbers also comes from management by respective state
and federal wildlife agencies through supplementation or reduction. It is this component
that is of great interest as it signifies the optimal management path, 𝑚̇. Due to their
successful population growth, after the initial reintroduction of 65 animals, management
of wolf numbers only comes in the form of removal in our model. The main tools for
managers to reduce the population comes in the form of harvesting, permitted hunting
and trapping, and wildlife agency removal.
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The wolf dynamics are a key component in determining the economic benefits in
the URM region. As explained in the theoretical model, both the benefits and costs are a
function of wolf numbers. Benefits are simplified to the revenue created from the
management of wolves through hunting and trapping permit sales. As previously
mentioned, this is the main tool used to maintain population numbers but also generates a
significant source of revenue to help fund management activities. Greater wolf numbers
allow permit sales to increase, generating more income. We ignore the additional local
economic revenue generated from tourism as it is fairly constant, not directly related to
wolf numbers, and is difficult to isolate across the three states.
Costs come in the form of management agency costs and reimbursements for
livestock depredations from wolves. These are also considered population dependent as
larger number of wolves potentially lead to greater human-wildlife conflict leading to
more damages and agency action. While agency control stays fairly constant with
budgetary constraints, problem animals and packs removal are costly and variable. State
funded reimbursements for livestock depredations should have a positive relationship
with populations numbers, despite fluctuations in livestock prices.
Results from the theoretical model justify the need to create a number of different
scenarios for the model. Generally, the optimal management paths of individual states
differ from the joint scenario in two ways, management costs and wolf growth dynamics.
Initially, we estimate outcomes for each state individually using historical data. We then
create a joint model that approaches wolf management collaboratively across all three
states. We develop three different scenarios where we assume different management
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costs. These are then compared to the cumulative results, by simply summing the results
from the individual state models.
We calibrate the model using a regression-based estimation approach to obtain
reasonable inputs based on previous research and literature. Historical wolf population
dynamics data and management costs are drawn from the individual state agency wolf
monitoring reports (for example see (Idaho Department of Fish and Game 2016; Montana
Fish, Wildlife & Parks 2019; Wyoming Game and Fish Department et al. 2018))6. We
also obtain target population levels from these agency reports allowing us to reasonably
estimate wolf carrying capacities for both individual and joint scenarios. In order to
develop a reasonable estimate for the intrinsic growth rate of wolves, we use a variety of
previous studies for different populations of gray wolves in various regions of the
(Tanner, 1975; Varley & Boyce, 2006). Table C.1 of the appendix summarizes the main
calibrated variables used in our system dynamics model.

4.4.2.1. Simulation Results for Individual States
The system dynamics model allows us to compare multiple scenarios across all
states under the two types of management structures. Figure 4.3 shows the individual
states modeled outcomes for number of wolves and harvesting levels using historical data
through 2020. We then extend the model into the future in order to find a stabilized
equilibrium for maximized net benefits, number of wolves, and harvesting levels. The
level of wolves removed from the system (harvesting rate), either by hunting or

6

See also (Hoylan et al. 2011; Idaho Fish and Game 2018; 2019; 2020; Mack et al. 2010; Montana Fish,
Wildlife & Parks 2010; 2011; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017a; 2017b; 2018; 2019; Nadeau et al. 2006;
2007; Wyoming Game and Fish Department et al. 2013; 2014; 2016; 2018; 2020)
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government actions, can be considered the management path that controls the wolf
population and balances the costs and benefits gained from wolves.
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Figure 4.3. Wolf populations and harvesting paths. Panel [a]: Idaho, Panel [b]: Montana,
and Panel [c]: Wyoming.
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Results from the model indicate that a stable equilibrium has been or potentially
can be reached for each state. While there are a number of steady states for population
numbers the difference here is that our model indicates a relative steady state that agency
managers can use as a guideline in order to maximize societal net benefits. We find that
an optimal number of wolves, 𝑤̇ ∗ , for Idaho, Montana, a Wyoming is approximately
957, 787, and 226 respectively. These estimates reflect the current ratio of wolf
populations but are indeed different than current estimates of the number of wolves for
each state. It is important to note that the Wyoming wolf estimate is only for the Wolf
Trophy Management Area and not the entire state. Areas outside of this region do not
usually require a permit to kill wolves often considering them to be a pest species. We
also estimate the corresponding management level, 𝑚̇ ∗ , for Idaho, Montana, and
Wyoming at 303, 228, and 75 wolves, respectively. This is the level of harvest required
to optimize net benefits.
Figure 4.4 shows how the net benefits from wolves have progressed over time and
where it stabilizes as the population and management of wolf equalizes. Except in the
case of Idaho, it is clear that the benefits are actually negative. It is important to
remember, however, that we have chosen to disregard the $34 million of economic
revenue for the surrounding area generated from wolf tourism activities which greatly
exceeds all management costs. We are more interested in optimizing the management
cost and benefits that are in the control of the managers. Additionally, focus should be on
the portions of the graphs that correspond to when the states actually took over managing
wolves. For Idaho and Montana this is in 2009, where there is a large increase in benefits
for Montana as hunting is opened up and revenue is generated through license sales. This
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drops off during the yearlong hunting ban across the region in 2010. After this period,
Idaho shows a large increase as wolf hunting is reinstated. As discussed earlier,
Wyoming is a special case as wolves have gone in and out of protection until 2017.
Further, hunting permit revenue tends to be smaller than the other two states as the
population of wolves and the areas requiring permits is small.
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Figure 4.4. Net benefits for individual states.

4.4.1.2. Simulation Results for Joint Management
As previously discussed in the theoretical section, overall management costs were
one possible difference between individual state and cooperative management strategies.
The idea of creating one agency responsible for wolf management for the three states
could potentially reduce redundancy and allow the URM area to be managed much more
efficiently. To illustrate this, we assess three different scenarios for management costs:
low, medium, and high. The high scenario replicates the actual cumulative costs incurred
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when states work independently as calculated from historical data. We then assume the
economic efficiencies of a ten percent reduction in management costs from one scenario
to the next and input these into the model. Figure 4.5 shows how the net benefit for the
region changes under each scenario. As expected, the cumulative and high management
cost scenario net benefits are approximately the same. Reducing overall management
costs understandably results in higher benefits, with the low-cost scenario leveling off at
around $410, 000 yearly. Small reductions in management costs can lead to large
increases net benefits where a ten percent decrease can boost benefits by one hundred
percent.
In addition to greater economic returns, the model also predicts that in the joint
management scenarios that the equilibrium wolf populations are higher than when states
act independently. As seen in Figure 4.6, there would be approximately 400 more wolves
under cooperative management. As the state boundaries arbitrarily divide the URM with
respect to population dynamics, taking a wider approach to managing populations takes
into account the mobility of the species throughout the region.
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Figure 4.5. Net benefit of joint wolf management under different joint cost scenarios
versus when states act independently.
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Figure 4.6. Wolf populations under independent and joint management.
We utilize a Monte Carlo simulation as a sensitivity analysis, accounting for the
uncertainty surrounding our results and the historical data. We created normal
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distributions for all the constant variables used in the baseline model with the mean of the
original value and 10% of this value as the standard deviation. We use Monte Carlo
simulations to estimate a mean and confidence interval for our variables of interest,
which are the wolf population, harvesting, and net benefits estimates. Table 4.1 provides
the estimates from the simulations along with graphs in the Appendix. In each case the
average is similar to the estimates above. However, the confidence interval around these
values provide insight into how these might fluctuate.

Table 4.1 Monte Carlo results.
Mean (Confidence Interval)
Wolf Population
Idaho

947 (636 – 1,448)

Montana

799 (542 – 1,088)

Wyoming

227 (133 – 312)

Joint

2,277 (1,324 – 3,212)

Management Level (harvest)
Idaho

298 (196 – 418)

Montana

229 (136 – 290)

Wyoming

74 (46 – 99)

Joint

609 (377 – 841)

Joint Management Net Benefit
Low Scenario

$385,982 (-$698,616 – $1,680,758)

Medium Scenario

-$111,295 (-$1,212,767 – $1,206,725)

High Scenario

-$596,284 (-$1,577,554 – $803,499)
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4.5. Conclusions
As states get the responsibility of managing important formerly endangered
species, such as the gray wolf, they must try and maximize the benefits of its presence
while limiting damage and costs. Because each state has its own wildlife agency and
budgets, it is likely that they often manage species without fully considering surrounding
states. The ability to collaborate with neighboring states has the potential for reducing
overall management levels and optimizing net benefit for the region. We develop
theoretical optimal control and system dynamics bioeconomic models to illustrate the
tradeoffs and problems faced by managers. Given the ambiguity of the theoretical model
we develop a numerical simulation to determine the steady states of number of wolves
and their management and corresponding net benefits by Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming
independently and jointly from 2000 to 2030. The results in this study suggest that there
could be possible positive spillover effects when states work together versus individually.
By controlling the population levels of wolves in a coordinated effort, each state’s cost
decrease. Borders are arbitrary in the sense of wildlife, and management and policy
decisions should incorporate this into their plans. This is not to argue that management
once again be taken from local state authority and placed into federal control, although
this could be justified. It merely highlights the efficiencies gained from a unified
approach.
Our findings corroborate with the literature (Johnson, 2020; Sims et al., 2020;
Smith et al., 2016). For example, similar to Sims et al. (2020), our results suggest that
Wyoming should take a rather conservative approach in harvesting wolves to ensure the
minimum requirement set forth by the federal government, while Montana and Idaho can

78

be more aggressive in their approach. While they suggest that trying to spread
responsibilities and cost savings from delisting could reduce regional net benefits, it is
also possible that cooperative management could allow for flexibility in management
efforts in the URM area. Additionally, their suggestion of establishing a federally
controlled compensation program for wolf damages could correspond similarly to our
joint model scenarios. They find that this reduces the incentive to keep wolf populations
low suggesting higher equilibrium populations as estimated by our joint model compared
to the cumulative results from independent state management.
While our results indicate there is some positive spillover effect in general, this
was based on a number of assumptions that could be challenged and can potentially affect
our results. Future work could relax the assumption of identical benefit, cost, and
damage functions across states. While the logistic growth function of wolves seems
suitable it could also be extended. Additionally, we assume that all states are putting
forth effort to manage the wolf population. It may be possible for some states to free ride
on the agreement taking advantage of other’s efforts, which we do not capture in the
current work. Nevertheless, our results support that under reasonable assumptions a
collaborative management effort could reduce costs. We believe that these findings
provide valuable insights for conservationists, policymakers, and other stakeholders.
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Appendix 4.A: Full solution to joint management model.
From section 4.3.2 we obtain the Hamiltonian of the joint management model:
2

𝐻 = d je𝐵#𝑤(𝑡),1 − 𝐷#𝑤(𝑡),1 − 𝐶#𝑚(𝑡),1 f + 𝜇1 [𝑓1 (𝑤1 , … , 𝑤2 ) − 𝑚1 ]k
13%

Taking the first order conditions we get:
𝐻(! = 𝐶( 1 − 𝜇1 = 0

∀ 𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁

(𝐴. 1)

2

−𝐻/! = 𝜇1̇ − 𝛿𝜇1 = −𝐵/! + 𝐷/ 1 − d 𝜇1 𝑓/!

∀ 𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁

(𝐴. 2)

13%

Taking the time derivative of Equations (A.1) we obtain the following:
𝐶(! (! 𝑚̇1 = 𝜇̇ 1 → 𝑚̇1 =

𝜇̇ 1

(𝐴. 3)

𝐶(! (!

substituting in 𝜇1 and 𝜇̇ 1 into Equation (A. 3) and rearranging gives the optimal
management paths given by Equation (6) in the text:
𝑚̇1 =

𝐶(! 𝛿 − 𝐵/ 1 + 𝐷/! − ∑2
13% 𝐶( 1 𝑓1,/!
𝐶(! (!
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∀ 𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁

Appendix 4.B: Phase Diagram of the Single and Joint State Management Model
In this appendix we assume a shape of the 𝑚̇ = 0 isocline to illustrate some of the
important dynamics of the single and joint state model. Rondeau (2001) shows through
very similar dynamics that the shape of the 𝑚̇ = 0 isocline is two discontinuous curves,
and we use for illustrations purposes.7 Figure 4.B.1 shows the phase diagram in the
population (w)-management (m) space with three potential equilibria (when 𝑚̇ = 0 and
𝑤̇ = 0 cross each other). The discontinuous isocline m represents that of the single state
and 𝑚1 is that of the joint-state problem. In the joint problem the wolf population is now
based on all wolves in the region, the 𝑤̇ = 0 isocline gets shifted upward and outward
compared to the single state problem. As mentioned in the text, the equilibrium condition
for 𝑚̇ = 0 given by Equation (11) suggests that investment in wolves can come from
surrounding states as well. Thus, it seems plausible that this spillover effect would shift
the individual 𝑚̇ isocline curves in the joint problem downward compared to the single
state problem. Under these assumptions the optimal solution of the individual state
management (harvesting) level would drop, from 𝑚∗ to 𝑚1∗ , and theoretically costs less.
This all relies on the assumption that the number of wolves is high enough that the path is
heading towards the furthest equilibrium. However, near the middle equilibrium it can be
seen that individual management may actually increase with cooperation.

7

Although Rondeau (2001) caution that these curves could potentially take on a number of different
shapes giving a number of potential equilibria.
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Figure 4.B.1. Comparison of two management options. (Individual management is in
blue and joint management in green)
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Appendix 4.C. Empirical Model Variables and Additional Results
In Table 4.C.1 we provide all the variables that were used in the empirical model.
Inputted data came from a variety of sources listed in the last column of the table and
ranged from individual state monitoring reports to previous estimations in the literature.
Estimated variables were generated using regression models and historical data. Finally,
we make assumptions on the management levels for the three different scenarios based
on the cumulative management costs of the three states over time. Figure 4.C.1 provides
a schematic of the empirical model.
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Table 4.C.1. Calibrated and estimated variables used in the empirical model.
Parameter
in the
theoretical
model

Variable in the
empirical model

Definition

Unit

Value

Monte Carlo*

Calibrati
on
Method

wolf

196 wolves

wolf

92 wolves

wolf

35 wolves

wolf

323 wolves

%/yr

Function**

NO fixed
NO fixed
NO fixed
NO fixed
YES

Agency
Reports
Agency
Reports
Agency
Reports
Agency
Reports
Literature

%/yr

Function**

YES

Literature

%/yr

Function**

YES

Literature

%/yr

Function**

YES

Literature

wolf

5,000 wolves

YES

wolf

1,500 wolves

YES

wolf

1,500 wolves

YES

wolf

500 wolves

YES

Agency
Reports
Agency
Reports
Agency
Reports
Agency
Reports

wolf/
yr
wolf/
yr
wolf/
yr
wolf/
yr

Function***

YES

Estimated

Function***

YES

Estimated

Function***

YES

Estimated

Function***

YES

Estimated

POPULATION
𝑤!"#

𝑓(𝑤)"#
-.)/,0

INITIAL WOLVES ID
INITIAL WOLVES MT
INITIAL WOLVES WY
INITIAL WOLVES - ID
WY MT
Wolf Growth - ID WY
MT
Wolf Growth - ID

𝑓(𝑤)$%
-.)/,0

Wolf Growth - MT

𝑓(𝑤)$%
-.)/,0

Wolf Growth - WY

𝑤!$%
𝑤!&'
()*+,

𝑤!

()*+,

𝑓(𝑤)-.)/,0

𝑓(𝑤)11
()*+,
𝑓(𝑤)11
"#

Carrying Capacity- ID
WY MT
Carrying Capacity- ID

𝑓(𝑤)11
$%

Carrying Capacity MT

𝑓(𝑤)11
&'

Carrying Capacity- WY

𝑚(𝑡)()*+,

harvest - ID WY MT

Initial wolf population in the ID
model
Initial wolf population in the MT
model
Initial wolf population in the WY
model
Initial wolf population in the joint
model
Intrinsic wolf population growth
rate in the joint model
Intrinsic wolf population growth
rate in the ID model
Intrinsic wolf population growth
rate in the MT model
Intrinsic wolf population growth
rate in the WY model
Carrying Capacity for the joint
model
Carrying Capacity for the ID
model
Carrying Capacity for the MT
model
Carrying Capacity for the WY
model

Management
𝑚(𝑡)"#

harvest - ID

𝑚(𝑡)$%

harvest - MT

𝑚(𝑡)&'

harvest - WY

Harvesting function in the joint
model
Harvesting function in the ID
model
Harvesting function in the MT
model
Harvesting function in the WY
model

Economic Benefit
2)/

LOW M

Low management cost scenario

USD

$750,000

YES

Assumed

MEDIUM M

Medium management cost
scenario
High management cost scenario

USD

$1,250,000

YES

Assumed

USD

$1,734,989.3
3

YES

Assumed

USD

YES

Estimated

YES

Estimated

YES

Estimated

YES

Estimated

benefit fcnt - joint

Management cost function in the
joint model
Management cost function in the
ID model
Management cost function in the
MT model
Management cost function in the
WY model
Benefit function in the joint model

YES

Estimated

𝐵(𝑤(𝑡))"#

benefit fcnt - ID

Benefit function in the ID model

USD

YES

Estimated

𝐵(𝑤(𝑡))$%

benefit fcnt

Benefit function in the MT model

USD

YES

Estimated

𝐵(𝑤(𝑡))&'

benefit fcnt - WY

Benefit function in the WY model

USD

YES

Estimated

𝐷(𝑤(𝑡))()*+,

damage fnct - joint

USD

YES

Estimated

damage fnct - ID

Damage function in the joint
model
Damage function in the ID model

USD

15199 𝑒 .""(#$(&)

YES

Estimated

damage fnct

Damage function in the MT model

USD

28076 𝑒 .""")$(&)

YES

Estimated

𝐶(𝑚(𝑡))()*+,
$34*56

𝐶(𝑚(𝑡))()*+,

7*-0

𝐶(𝑚(𝑡))()*+,
𝐶(𝑚(𝑡))8)*+,

HIGH M

𝐶(𝑚(𝑡))"#

management cost sce - ID
WY MT
management cost - ID

𝐶(𝑚(𝑡))$%

management cost - MT

𝐶(𝑚(𝑡))&'

management cost - WY

𝐵(𝑤(𝑡))()*+,

𝐷(𝑤(𝑡))"#

𝐷(𝑤(𝑡))$%
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USD
USD
USD
USD

𝐿𝑜𝑤; 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚; 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ
$600,000
$500,000
$634989.3
924.12𝑤(𝑡)
− 485158
693.75𝑤(𝑡)
+ 371056
500𝑤(𝑡)
− 29589
287.48𝑤(𝑡)
+ 34544
313196 𝑒 ."""#$(&)

𝐷(𝑤(𝑡))&'

damage fnct - WY

𝑁𝐵(𝑤)8)*+,

NB- Joint

𝑁𝐵(𝑤)"#

NB- ID

𝑁𝐵(𝑤)$%

NB-MT

𝑁𝐵(𝑤)&'

NB - WY

Damage function in the WY
model
Net benefit function in the joint
model
Net benefit function in the ID
model
Net benefit function in the MT
model
Net benefit function in the WY
model

USD
USD
USD
USD
USD

60627 𝑒 .""*+$(&)

Function***
*
Function***
*
Function***
*
Function***
*

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

Estimate
d
Estimate
d
Estimate
d
Estimate
d
Estimate
d

*”Yes” indicates that the variable had a normal distribution with the mean of the original value and 10% of that
as the standard deviation, while “No-fixed” indicates the variable was used in the Monte-Carlo simulation but
was assumed to be fixed at the original value. We created normal distributions for every constant variable existed
in the baseline model.
𝑤(𝑡)

** 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒A × 𝑤(𝑡)𝑖 × .1 − 𝑓(𝑤)𝑐𝑐𝑖 1 - 𝑓(𝑤)11
* is carrying capacity for state i
𝑖

*** 𝐼𝑓 𝑤(𝑡 − 1)𝑖 < 𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 0 wolf, otherwise 𝑤(𝑡)* × ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 – where harvesting rate includes
both hunting rate and lethal control rate
****𝑁𝐵(𝑤)* = 𝐵(𝑤(𝑡))* − 𝐷(𝑤(𝑡))* − 𝐶(𝑚(𝑡))*
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Figure 4.C.1. Conceptual diagram of the empirical model.
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